Digital Commons @ University of
Georgia School of Law
LLM Theses and Essays

Student Works and Organizations

1-1-2001

REGULATION S - RULES GOVERNING OFFERS AND SALES MADE
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT REGISTRATION UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
CAROLINE MARY RUTHERFORD LEE
University of Georgia School of Law

Repository Citation
LEE, CAROLINE MARY RUTHERFORD, "REGULATION S - RULES GOVERNING OFFERS AND SALES MADE
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT REGISTRATION UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933" (2001).
LLM Theses and Essays. 266.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/266

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works and Organizations at Digital
Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in LLM Theses and Essays by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have
benefited from this access For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

REGULATION S-RULES GOVERNING OFFERS

:

AND SALES MADE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
WITHOUT REGISTRATION UNDER THE SECURITIES

ACT OF 1933

Caroline

Mary Rutherfordlee

II

The University

of

Georgia

I
0€OnOI» LAW L1BHAXV

3

8425 00326 7486

Alexander Campbell King Law Library

N

REGULATION

S -

RULES GOVERNING OFFERS AND SALES MADE OUTSIDE

THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT REGISTRATION UNDER THE SECURITIES

ACT OF

1933

by

CAROLINE MARY RUTHERFORD LEE
L.L.B.,

A Thesis

B.COM., The University of Canterbury, New Zealand, 2000

Submitted

to the

Graduate Facility of The University of Georgia

in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF LAWS

ATHENS, GEORGL\
2001

LAW LrBRARY
fWivi:??<;iTY

OF GFOOv-r*

©2001
Caroline

Mary Rutherford Lee

All Rights Reserved.

REGULATION

S -

RULES GOVERNING OFFERS AND SALES MADE OUTSIDE

THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT REGISTRATION UNDER THE SECURITIES

ACT OF

1933

by

CAROLINE MARY RUTHERFORD LEE

Approved:

Date

^A^Hoos

Major Professor

^.

Approved:

^
Dean of the Graduate School

Date

%4o RJ- C^mk

Date
Chairman, Reading C(»hmittee

30

Aj)r>'

\

^

1

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in

2013

http://archive.org/details/regulationsrulesOOIeec

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

CHAPTER

ONE

1

Introduction

1

TWO

3

The Need For Disclosure

3

Globalization

5

United States Federal Regime

6

THREE

10

Brief Overview of Regulation S

Regulation S Details, 1990

10

- 1998

12

FOUR

;

21

Abuses Which Occurred After the Introduction of Regulation S

21

Marketplace Concerns About Regulation S

30

FIVE

34

Events Leading up to the

Amendment of Regulation S

34

Developing Criticism of the Regulation

34

Problematic Practices Release

35

Fifteen

Day Reporting Requirement

Proposed Amendments

to

for Regulation S Offerings

Regulation S
iv

36
36

V

SIX

38

Amendments

General Statement

Amendments

38

to Regulation S

is

Not Affected by

to the Issuer

the

Amendments

39

and Resale Safe Harbors

39

Other Changes to the Amendments

48

SEVEN

51

Probable Impacts of Amendments on Regulation S

51

Probable Impacts of Amendments on Regulatory Abuses

52

Probable Impacts of Amendments on Marketplace Concerns

57

EIGHT

60

Recommendations Should Abuses and Marketplace Concerns Regarding

The Regulation Continue After
Recommendations
Domestic Issuers

if the

in the

the

Amendments

Amended Regulation Becomes

Absence of Abuses

too Restrictive for

66

NINE

68

The Challenges Posed by Globalization
Approaches

60

to the International Regulation

TEN

68
of Securities

70
77

Conclusion

77

BIBLIOGRAPHY

81

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

Underpinning

an}' regulatory

regime

outcome and achieving a perceived

is

a dichotomy

fairness.

between achieving

certaint\'

While such a discussion may seem out of

place in the context of a regulatory regime dealing with offshore offerings,

serves to emphasize

of Regulation
Part

some of the

of

it

nonetheless

considerations encountered in the following examination

S'.

Two

of this thesis outlines the development of the disclosure regime that

is

evidenced in the United States Federal Securities Regulations and then goes on to

examine how

this regime, first established in the 1930s, dealt

with the advent of

globalization. Part Three then looks at Regulation S. introduced in 1990.

the Regulation

is

An overview of

provided, followed by a detailed examination of the various provisions

of the Regulation. The thesis then moves on to Part Four which sets out some of the more

common

abuses that began to occur shortly after the introduction of Regulation S. and

also notes

some of the marketplace concerns regarding

Part Five details the events, criticisms and

SEC

the operation of the Regulation.

releases that led

up

to the

amendment of

Regulation S in 1998, before Part Six deals with the actual amendments themselves in

some

'

detail.

Regulation S

Under

As

-

it

has only been a relatively short time since the adoption of the

Made Outside the United States Without Registration
Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. 230.901 - 230.904 (1990) [hereinafter Original Regulation S]

Rules Governing Offers and Sales

the Securities

1

amendments, Part Seven assesses the probable impacts which the amendments may
have on both the abuses and the marketplace concerns. Following on from

this. Part

Eight

provides recommendations should the abuses and concerns continue after the

amendments. Part Nine

calls into question the desirability

securities laws extraterritorially

of applying American

and discusses various approaches

regulation of securities before the brief conclusion in Part Ten.

to the international

CHAPTER TWO

The Need For Disclosure

Securities

by

their very nature are intangible

Instead, their value

owner

to vote

comes from

and also

to

the rights

and do not possess any extrinsic value.

which they bestow on

make claims upon both

the assets and

their holder, entitling the

income of the

much

Therefore, a prospective purchaser of securities presumably needs as
as possible relating to the issuer so as to be better able to

issuer.

information

make an informed investment

decision.

In the United States, the collapse of the securities market in

1

929 provided the

impetus for the creation of a mandatory federal disclosure system. The Securities Act
introduced in 1933,

is

,

concerned with public offerings and the sale of securities via the

means of interstate commerce.
The underlying philosophy behind
assumed

that disclosure

would prevent the

the

Act was

flotation

that

of disclosure, as

it

was

of fraudulent securities as had been

seen in America between 1919 and 1929. During this period
savings evaporate in securities that were often worthless.

many

investors

saw

their life

The 1933 Act prohibited both

the offering and sale of a security that had not been registered with the Federal Trade

Commission

^

(later,

the Securities

15U.S.C. s77a-77z-3(1994)

Exchange Commission (SEC)) and,

further, the

Act

.

4
required that a prospectus

be available to

made. In short the prospectus
information so as to

The

is

all

potential investors to

an attempt to provide issuers with

make an "informed" investment

Securities

Exchange Act of 1934

,

the protection of secondary market trading but

whom the offer was
all

the necessary

decision.

by comparison,

is

more concerned with

too also contains mandatory disclosure

it

requirements.

However
criticism.

Many

the United States' mandatory disclosure regime has not been without

commentators'* have suggested instead that there are sufficient market

motivations for managers to disclose information and thus that there

is

no need for

federal intervention in securities markets.

Issuers,

1933 Act. One

however, have often sought

way of doing

to

avoid the registration provisions of the

so has been to seek refuge in one of the so called '"safe

harbors", which, if satisfied, have the effect of not requiring the issue to be approved

the

^
*

SEC

before being offered and sold.

One such

safe harbor

is

Regulation

by

S.''

15U.S.C. s78a-78gg(1994)

JAMES

D.

mandatory
prefer

COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 43

(3d ed. 1997) where

it

is

noted that " the

disclosure requirements of the '33 and '34 Acts have not escaped the criticism of those

Adam

who

Smith's invisible hand to the heavy regulatory hand of the federal securities laws".

Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman. 28 BUS. LAW. 631 (1973) and A. A. Sommer.
A Program by the ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, 36 BUS. LAW. 19 (1980)

See also
JR.

1

reprinted
1

13-120

m LARRY

(4"''ed.

D.

SODERQUIST & THERESA

1999) where comments are

A.

GADALDON. SECURITIES REGULATION

made by Sommer and Kripke

that disclosure

does not need to

be addressed by a federal body, but instead that there are more sufficient market incentives for disclosure to
take place.
*

Original Regulation S, supra note

1

Globalization

The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed
"Through decreased communication

the advent of a truly global marketplace.

costs and

improved international financial

connections, investors and issuers are able to shift capital quickly fi"om one country to

another"

.

Essentially, Regulation S

as the increasing

came about because of ever

volume of international transactions placed

increasing globalization

strains

on the previous

system of extraterritoriality.

The move
problems.

It

to a global capital

market raises

has been suggested by commentators

The

may have

traditional goal

to be

tempered

many

challenges and potential

that;

of securities regulation, investor protection,

in a "global

market" by (1) the desire of U.S.

investors to invest and trade in foreign securities, (2) the reality that they

may do

so outside the United States, and (3) the importance to the United

States of maintaining the world's leading domestic capital market,

which

requires openess to foreign issuers [and foreign investors]."

The introduction of Regulation S

is

an example of this, investor protection

through disclosure takes a backseat to the goals of reducing the cost of raising capital
offshore and enhancing the attractiveness of the U.S. securities market to overseas

investors.

*

Stephen

J.

Choi

& Andrew T.

Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of
CAL. L. REV. 903, 905-906 (1998)
PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE; TRANSACTIONS,

Securities Regulation. 71 S.
^

HAL

S.

POLICY,

SCOTT &
AND REGULATION

32 (4th ed 1997)

A

6

An example
and sales by

US

of globalization in the United States

was

the increase in purchases

investors of foreign equities from an estimated $17.9 billion in 1980 to

$741.6 billion in 1995.^

Even

the

SEC acknowledged the

trend

when

it

talked of ''the development of

active international trading markets and the significant increase in offshore offerings of

securities, as well as the significant participation

So
capital

it

is

by U.S investors

in foreign markets."'

obvious that the rapid expansion of the global marketplace changed the U.S.

markets dramatically. Foreign issuers have sought to offer their securities to U.S.

investors. U.S. investors have looked to invest in offshore offerings

and U.S. issuers have

sought to offer their securities to overseas investors, often for the purposes of raising

capital.

In this thesis the regulatory

problems posed by offerings which occur outside of the

United States are examined.'"

United States Federal Securities Regime

The two canons of securities

regulation in the United States are full and fair disclosure"

and the concept of registration. Relying on the theory of disclosure

RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET

"

(8th ed. 1998), quoting
U.S. Securities
'
1

Mann

&

AL.,

""

and the underlying

AND MATERIALS I6I4
Mergers and Acquisitions: The Experience of the

SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES

Sirigiano, International

and Exchange Commission, (Working

Paper,

May

1,

1991)

Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6863, 17 C.F.R. Parts 200 and 230. 55
8306,

'"

i.e.

at

1

83 4,
1

May

2

1

990. [hereinafter Adopting Release]

Offshore Offerings

" See discussion infra Part
''Id

II.

PR

7

assumption that an investor can make up his

own mind

if

he has

all

the material facts,

the U.S. securities system does not address the fairness of a transaction.

Section 5 of the Securities Act'^ forms the cornerstone of the Act. In general

terms section 5 prohibits the offering and sale of securities until a registration statement
regarding the security has been approved by the SEC.''^
Generally, a registration statement relating to the public offering of securities

must be
issuer)

is

filed

with the

SEC

can offer the shares

before the issuer (or persons in control relationships with the

to the U.S. public. In the registration statement information

provided about the issuer, the security

the offering will be put.

has satisfied the

States

is

SEC no

amongst other
sale

itself

details.

and the use

to

which the proceeds from

Thus, until the offeror of the securities

of the securities can take place. As a result the United

widely regarded as having a particularly onerous registration process with the

cost of complying with the Securities Act adding significantly to the cost of the issue.

Section 5 of the Securities Act 1933 provides for prohibitions relating to

"Interstate

Commerce".

It

states that unless a security has a registration statement

unlawful for any person to use Interstate

Commerce

is

Commerce

it

is

to sell the security. Interstate

defined in section 2(7) of the same Act as meaning:

commerce in securities
among the several

communication
between the District of
Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other
Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the
District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia.'"
[T]rade or

relating thereto

'^

or any transportation or
States or

15 U.S.C 77(e) (1994)

'''

15 U.S.C 77 c-e (1994) Section 5 states that any offer or sale of securities using
must be registered unless some form of exemption can be granted.
"^

15 U.S.C. 77b(3)( 1994)

interstate

commerce

Taken
even

if

literally,

would not be

it

difficult to believe that

undertaken offshore, would come within section 5

system or telephone system'^ were used
Thus, for example,

if

foreign issuer

in the process

made telephone

if at

However, such a
reach)

calls to the

stage the

US

mail

United States in the

come within

section 5 by

commerce.

literal interpretation (potentially

would be unworkable,

some

of selling the securities abroad.

course of selling securities then that would seemingly also
virtue of the broad definition of interstate

any offering whatsoever,

to say the least, as

it

giving section 5 a worldwide

would imply

that a public offer or sale

of securities anywhere in the world that involved the use of US interstate commerce must
be registered with the SEC. Not only would
issuers,

it

would

this strike fear into the hearts

also cause problems with foreign regulatory regimes as well as creating

enforcement problems. Yet given that the Securities Act was enacted
before the advent of international offerings,

territorial

of foreign

it is

in

an era largely

not then surprising to find such an extra-

reach contained within the legislation.

Securities Act Release 4708*^

extent the legislation

Commission

set

was

was

the

SEC's

first

attempt

at clarifying to

what

extraterritorial. In this short interpretative release the

out the view that the registration requirements of the 1933 Act were

largely for the benefit of American investors.

Issued in 1964, during the development of the Eurobond market. Release 4708

stated that if the "offering

'*

Or any

other

is

made under circumstances reasonably designed

means of modem communication such

as the Internet, e-mail and faxes.

to preclude

9
distribution or redistribution of the securities within, or to nationals of, the United

would not be required under section

States", then registration

4708, the

SEC

stated that

it

would not bring an action

commerce were

However,
clear as the

SEC

in spite

Therefore, in Release

for the failure

to register securities distributed offshore to foreign nationals,

interstate

5.

even

if the

of this, the position adopted by the

SEC was

American
1

and re-interpreted Release 4708* but

companies were compelled

to seek

staff that their particular offerings

'^

not entirely

still

did not provide any legal or economical reasoning to explain

This ensuing uncertainty resulted in a number of '"no action letters"

States".

means of

involved.

other than that the registration requirements were created to protect

interpreted

of U.S. corporations

The position was not

its

position

investors.

o

where the

failed to shape the policy.

SEC

"Most

an individualized determination by the Commission's

would not be deemed

clarified until Regulation

to

occur in the United

S was adopted in

1

990^

Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 33-4708, July 9 1964,

WL

3661 (SEC) [29 FR 9828]. [hereinafter Release 4708]
"no action letter" is a guarantee from the SEC that it will not bring action against the issuer for being
in breach of section 5. Such a letter is a costly exercise to undertake and also does not provide a clear
precedent for other issuers to rely on.
'*

A

'*'

JENNINGS, supra

note

Kellye Y. Testy, Comity

REV. 927(1994).

8, at

577.

and Cooperation:

Securities Regulation in

a Global Marketplace, 45 ALA.

L.

CHAPTER THREE

Brief Overview of Regulation S

With the

release of Regulation S in 1990 the

SEC

intended to help large American

corporations in selling their securities to foreign investors, with the foreign investors
anticipated to hold such securities for a considerable period of time."""

such issuers from registering under the Securities Act, the
regime, as opposed to the extraterritorial approach that

SEC

was

set

By exempting

up a

territorial

implicit under section 5.

Regulation S provides guidance on which securities transactions conducted outside the

United States

may come under the

In limiting the

reach of section

span of section

5,

the

SEC

5.

stated that "principles of

comity

and

the reasonable expectations of participants in the global markets justified reliance on

laws applicable in jurisdictions outside the United States to define requirements for
"^"^

transactions effected offshore.

" L Cohen,

Rules Permitting Offshore Stock Sales Yields Deals That Spark

SEC Concerns, WALL

ST.

J,

Apr 26 1994 at CL where Sara Hanks, a New York attorney who helped write Regulation S, commented
"the rule was intended to help big. healthy companies sell bonds and stock to long term European
investors".

" The
^*

principle of comity emphasizes restraint and tolerance by nations
Adopting Release, supra note 9, at 83 14
1

in international affairs.

11

Made up of Rules

901-904, Regulation S provided

''safe harbors"'^"'' for

both

foreign distributions and resales of unregistered securities of U.S. and foreign issuers.

The underlying policy

rationale for the introduction of Regulation S

was

to

reduce the cost of raising capital offshore by giving overseas markets greater
accessibility to domestic issuers,"^ especially in the light of the globalization trend.

Essentially,

as

opposed

it

opened the door

them

to limiting

for domestic issuers to raise capital in the global

to the internal market. Further,

it

market

increased the

competitiveness of US issuers in the eyes of foreign investors.

Another reason
certainty for issuers

exact position of the

-

for the introduction of Regulation S

as under Release

SEC was

4708 and the no action

its

to provide greater

letters that

followed, the

not evident.

But even though Regulation S was an attempt
offshore capital, after

was

introduction

it

to tidy

became evident

up the regulation of

that there

were unintended

loopholes in the regulation. These loopholes were essentially contrary to the stated
intention of the

SEC when

it

introduced Regulation S.

these loopholes. Regulation S

was not seen

capital. Eventually, as a result

of the abuses, the

The amendments took place
regulation

is

As

as an effective

despite Preliminary

a result of the exploitation of

way of raising

SEC amended
Note 2

offshore

the regulation in 1998.

to Regulation

S stating that the

not available for "any transaction or series of transactions that, although in

^*

i.e. an exemption from the 1933 Securities Act registration requirements
Cohen, supra note 23.
" Offshore Offers and Sale, Securities Act Release No. 33-7505, 17 C.F.R. Parts 230 and 249, 63 FR 9632,
ss 230.901 - 230.905, February 25 1998. [hereinafter Amending Release]. The amended Regulation S

^^

modified the classification of securities under the safe harbor provisions and changed some compliance
requirements.

.

12
technical compliance with the rules,

registration provisions of the

SEC

Act"

is

.

part of a plan or

So

it is

scheme

to

evade the

arguable that this provision provides the

with sufficient powers to intervene in situations where they see Regulation S being

used in any unintended matter, irrespective of whether the safe harbors have been
satisfied.

What

follows in this paper

is

with the abuses of it. Following

an examination of the existing Regulation S together

that, the

changes will be examined

in light

of the abuses

to see if they will actually address the apparent problems.

Regulation S Details, 1990 - 1998
Fundamentally, Regulation S
definitions in Rule 902, and

made up of a

is

general statement provided in Rule 901'

two non exclusive "safe harbors"

in

,

Rules 903 and 904.^°

Rule 90 1 provides that offers and sales of securities which do not take place in
T-)

"2 1

the U.S.

903.

are not subjected to the registration requirements of the Securities Act.

known

as the "issuer safe harbor", creates a safe harbor for distributors

"

(i.e.

participants in a distribution such as issuers, underwriters and the like). Essentially,

classifies issuers into

one of the three categories on the basis of the

that the securities of that issuer will enter the

known

^*

"
^"
^'

^^

Id. at

US

Preliminary Note 2

Id.

Note that "Rule 901" refers to s230.901
"Rule 903" refers to s230.903, and "Rule 904" refers to s230.904.
with "United States" being defined in s230.902(p)

Id

at

Id.

S230.903

1

.

it

relative likelihood

markets to trade. Meanwhile Rule 904,

as the "resale safe harbor", creates a safe harbor for resales

Original Regulation S. supra note

Rule

by

others. This

13
includes investors

who procure

securities through a private

transaction that

exempt from

registration

concerns

itself

is

US

or in a

under Rule 144A^^. Thus. Rule 904

with whether the purchase of an unregistered security abroad has in fact

been undervvxitten and then resold

A.

placement in the

to

an American.

The General Statement the Offers and Sales of Securities outside the
subject to the Registration Requirements of Section

5,

US are not

as outlined under Rule 901,

Original Regulation S.

Rule 901 contains the general statement which provides that registration requirements
under section

5

do not apply

to offers or sales

of securities outside the U.S.

It

states

that:

For the purposes only of Section
sell", "sell", "sale",

and "offer

to

buy"

and sales

that

offer

basis. If the offer

and sale

and

is

''offer", "offer to

be deemed to include offers and

and

occur outside the United

The determination of whether an

made on an ad hoc

of the Act, the terms

shall

sales that occur within the United States

offers

5

shall

be deemed not to include

States."''^

made

outside the United States

sale satisfy the conditions

is

of either of the safe-

harbor provisions in Rules 903 or 904, such a transaction will be deemed to have
occurred outside the United States and will therefore not be subject to the registration

requirements of section

"

5.

17C.F.R, 230.1 44A( 1997). Rule 144 A was adopted by the SEC on April 19 1990. It establishes an
exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act for qualifying resales to 'qualified
institutional buyers' of securities that were not fungible (i.e not of the same class) at the time of issuance
with a class of securities publicly traded in the United States.
^^
17 C.F.R. Section 230.901 (1996)

14
B.

Two General Conditions

All offers and sales, whether

must

made

two general conditions

satisfy

In addition, the issuer

must

and Resale Safe Harbors

required under the Issuer
in reliance

on the issuer or the resale safe-harbor,
be considered outside the United

in order to

satisfv' specific

States.

conditions that are set out in each safe-

harbor provision.

First,

Rule 902
is

not

any offer or

sale

(h) provides that

made

of securities must be made

an offer or sale

to a person in the

United

is

made

States^"^

and

in

an "offshore transaction".

in

an offshore transaction

if either

of two additional

that the

buyer

if the offer

requirements are satisfied.

The

first

of the alternative requirements

is

States, or that the seller reasonably believes that the

States, at the

time the buy order

is

originated.^^

satisfying the offshore transaction requirement

designated offshore securities market

.

buyer

is

The second
is

is

outside the United

outside of the United

alternative

means of

to execute the transaction

However,

if the seller

or

its

agent

on a

knows

that

the transaction has been prearranged with a buyer in the United States, the second
TO

alternative will not be satisfied

^'

But

s

.

230.902(h)(B)(2) states that "offers and sales of securities specifically targeted

at identifiable

groups of U.S. citizens abroad, such as members of the U.S. armed forces serving overseas, shall not be
deemed to be made in "offshore transactions".
^''

^'
^*

17C.F.Rs230.902(h)(l)(ii)(A)(1996)
These non U.S. securities exchanges and markets are
17 C.F.R s230.902(h)(l)(ii)(B) (1996)

listed in 17

C.F.R.

s

230.902 (1996)

15

The second general condition
sale to

in the

that

must be

be considered outside the United States

is

satisfied in order for

that there be

an offer and

no direct selling

efforts

United States.
Therefore, if a transaction satisfies the two general conditions (namely that

takes place offshore and that there

may

is

no directed

selling in the

United States), then

it

it

well qualify for an exemption from registration under one of the following safe

harbors.

C.

Issuer Safe Harbor

Concerning

itself

with the likelihood that the issuer's securities will enter the

Rule 903

market'*".

is

applicable to offers and sales by issuers, distributors and their

any persons acting on

affiliates or

and foreign issuers offering

The

behalf The safe harbor

upon

non U.S.

among

three categories of securities

factors such as the nationality

and reporting status of the issuer

interest in the issuer's securities"

"

applicable to securities of foreign reporting issuers

who have

230.902(c

in s

)

as

"any

The

activity undertaken for the

first

category

who have no

The second category

US.

Defined

.

of foreign issuers

issuers, including the securities

substantial market interest in their securities in the

^'

available to both U.S.

is

securities outside the United States.

and the degree of U.S. market
applies to

their

issuer safe harbor distinguishes

offerings "based

US

purpose of

is

a substantial market

...

conditioning the market

in the

United States for any of the securities being offered"
***

The

greater the likelihood that the securities will flow back into the United States, the

procedural requirements necessary to avoid registration are.
'"

Adopting Release, supra note

'^

17 C.F.R.

s

9, at

230.903(c )(1)(1996)

18307

more

difficult the
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interest in their securities in the U.S.,

and also

to certain securities issued

"^^
nonreporting foreign issuers. Finally, category three applies to

by

issuers not under

all

category one or two. This third category includes domestic nonreporting issuers and
foreign nonreporting issuers
their securities. ^^

the

more onerous

The more

who have

a substantial market interest within the

US

for

likely that the securities are going to enter the U.S. markets,

the category requirements are.

Category One

/.

This issuer category, which applies to securities both offered and sold by foreign

issuers'*'^

having

''no substantial

securities offered

backed by "the

and sold

full faith

in

US

market

interest"'*^ in their securities

"overseas directed

offerings""*''.

and credit of a foreign government"

It

and also to

also applies to securities

and securities issued

pursuant to employee benefit plans administered offshore.'*

Both offers and sales under

this

category do not require any further conditions to

be satisfied other than the two general conditions discussed above, (namely that

it

be an

offshore transaction and that there are no directed selling efforts in the US).

This category

is

the least onerous issuer safe harbor category because the

has taken the view that such offers are the least likely to be of risk to domestic
investors (that

is,

Id

at s

''

Id

at s

230.903(c) (2)
230.903 (c) (3)

^^

Id
Id

at s

230.902(0(1)

*^

**

at

Id. at

s230.902(n)
s230.903(c)(l

Id. at s

230.903

US

category one securities are unlikely to flow back to the United States).

'^

"•

SEC

(ii),

(c )(1

with an "overseas directed offering" being defined

(iii),

with "foreign government" defined at

s

230.902

at

s230.902(j)

(e)
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Category Two

//.

The second
securities

market

safe harbor for issuers under the original Regulation S

of domestic reporting

issuers, foreign reporting issuers

is

applicable to

who had

a substantial

interest in the U.S. for their securities, non-reporting foreign issuers (with

respect to their debt securities) and non-participating preferred stock and asset backed

securities of the non-reporting foreign issuers.^^ This safe harbor only applies to equity

securities of domestic, reporting issuers,

market interesf in the U.S. for

to foreign issuers

with a "substantial

their securities.^'

Securities falling within category

and also several selling

and

restrictions'^.

two

are subject to the

two general conditions

Broadly speaking, these regulations can be

divided into restrictions regarding transactions and restrictions relating to offerings.
Transactional restrictions necessitate that securities sold before the end of a 40

day

restricted period are not offered or sold for the benefit

distributors

who

sell securities to securities

of a

US

person"

.

Thus

professionals require notice from the

purchaser that they too are subject to the same requirements as the distributor.

A "U.S.

person"

States". ^^ Therefore,

United States

*"

'"

"
^*

classified as a U.S. person under Regulation S.

230.903 (c)(l)(iv)

Id. at s

230.903

That

it

at s

(c )(2)

be an offshore transaction and that there be no directed selling efforts in the U.S.

17 C.F.R.

Id

defined as "any natural person resident in the United

follows that any foreign or domestic national resident in the

Id. at s

yd
*^

is

it

is

s

230.903(c

230.903(c

)(2)(ii)-(iv)

)(2)(iii),

"M ats230.903(o)(l)(i)

(1996)

with "restricted period" being defined

in

s230.902(m)

"
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For corporations, the place of incorporation usually

SEC

has observed that

jurisdiction

by a

US

if a

corporation

is

is

controlling."^ But, the

organized or incorporated in a foreign

person, with the purposes of investing in securities not registered

with the SEC, then such a corporation will come within the definition of a
for the purposes

of Regulation

US

person

S.^^

Offering restrictions, of which there are two. must also be met under this second
CO

category.

They must be adopted by

required to agree in writing that

all

the entire offering.'

offers

First,

every distributor

is

and sales made before the ending of the

restricted period will be carried out either in line with the safe harbor provisions

Regulation S. or in line with registration or an exemption. Secondly,

documents used

in

restricted period

must contain a statement

all

of

materials and

connection with the offer and sale of the securities during the

registered and further that they

may

stating that the securities

have not been

not be offered or sold in the U.S. to a U.S. person

unless they are registered or there has been an exemption.''

Category Three

///.

The

third issuer safe harbor is essentially a residual provision for issuers that

within the

first

two

categories. Therefore, this category includes issuers of domestic

^'/c/.

ats230.902(o)(l)(ii)(v)

"

at s

'"
''

Id

230.902(o)(viii)(A)-(B)

Id. at s

230.903(c

Id

230.902(h)(2)

at s

do not

)(3)(i),

with "offering restrictions" being defined in s230.902(h)

fall
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nonreporting equity securities and foreign nonreporting issuers with a substantial

market

interest in the

US

for their securities.

Because category three

when

there

there

is little

an attempt to protect against unregistered distributions

a possibilit>' that the securities

is

may flow back

into the U.S.

and where

information about the issuer, then the requirements having to be satisfied

under category three are

As

is

^^

stricter

then the other two categories.

well as satisfying the two general conditions (namely of an offshore

transaction and no directed selling efforts in the U.S.), securities

coming within the

third

category are also required to satisfy the two offering restrictions, similar to category
two, however the third category requires that the securities be subjected to a one year
'

restricted period.

Further, the transactional requirements under category three are stricter than

those under the second category. Purchasers are required to certify that they are not U.S.

persons and further that they are not acquiring the securities for the benefit of a U.S.
person. ^^ Purchasers are also required to agree to resell the securities only in line with

the rules controlling Regulation S or pursuant to registration, or

any other exemption.

Category three transactional restrictions also require that issuers
a legend, that the transfer of such securities

accordance with Regulation

^^

"

Id. at s

64

Id

Aligned

230.903(c)(3)

Id. at ss

" Id
" Id

S.^"^

230.902(h), 230.903(c) (3)(i)-(iii)(A)

at s

230.903(c )(3)(iii)(B)(l)

at s

230.903(c )(3)(iii)(B)(2)

at s

230.903(c )(3)(iii)(B)(3)

is

state,

prohibited unless the transfer

to this is the

is

^^

by means of
in

requirement that the issuer must

20
refuse to register any transfer of category three securities

who

requirements.^"^ Furthermore, those distributors

made

outside Regulation S

are selHng either equity or debt

securities before the expiration date of the restricted period are also required to notify

purchasers of their obligation to be subjected to the same restrictions on offers and sales
that apply to the distributor^^.

D. Resale Safe Harbor
Irrespective of whether a sale of an unregistered security

subsequent purchaser, an exemption

is

is

made by an

issuer or a

required from the registration requirements.^^ Rule

904 of Regulation S provides such a method

for the resale of unregistered securities

by

providing a safe harbor for the offshore resale of unregistered securities by persons other
than the issuer, distributor or their agents.
In order to be eligible for Rule 904,

namely

two general conditions must be

that the transaction takes place offshore

satisfied

-

and further that there be no directed

selling efforts within the U.S. If these are satisfied, then the resale is taken as

having

occurred outside the U.S. for the purposes of the general statement and also the
registration requirements.

'•^

**

69

Id. at s

230.903(c )(3)(iii)(B)(4)

Id. at s

230.903(c

)(3)(iv), the

two

restrictions are that

directed selling efforts in the U.S.
^''

'''

Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.

s

17 C.F.R.s 230.904 (1996)

"Id

5 (1994)

it

be an offshore transaction and that there are no

CHAPTER FOUR
Abuses Which Occurred After the Introduction of Regulation S

The intended

users of Regulation S were sound domestic corporations seeking the

placement of securities with long term offshore investors

in order to

compete

in the

global market place/°

But

after

one year the
7

of Regulation

S.

1

As

SEC

filed its first

enforcement action, involving violations

increasing enforcement actions were brought,

it

became

readily

apparent that the loopholes in Regulation S had not only been widely discovered, but
further that they

exposed Regulation S

to abuse, contrary to its stated intention as

outlined above. Further, concerns arose on Wall Street.^" There have been a

differing abuses of Regulation S. Detailed

number of

below are examples of different such abuses.

A. Illegal Resales within the Restricted Period.

Any resale of Regulation
period

is

S securities back into the

US

before the end of a restricted

a violation of Regulation S unless another exemption can be relied

registration has taken place.

""*

Release 4708, supra note 17

Westdon Holding & Inv., Inc., Securities Act Litigation Release No. 13,085
Easy Money. BARRON'S. Apr. 29, 1996
" Cohen, supra note 23, at ss 230.903(c )(2)(iii) and 230.903(c )(3)(iii)(A)

''

^^

SEC

J

V.

Scholl,

21

upon or
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Liability can arise

when

the restricted period

is

not adhered

to.

In

one

case^"^

a

broker was fined US$150,000 by the regulatory arm of the National Association of
Securities Dealers

(NASD) because one of the

brokerage's customers had purchased

Regulation S securities and then sold them back in the US. via the broker's accounts,
before the end of the restricted period for the securities. The broker in this case was fined

for failing to

make

the necessary "affirmative determiriation"

- such

as

marking on the

order form where the shares were located and whether the shares were in a deliverable

form -

in

determining whether the securities would be within the restricted periods,

before carrying out the sales.

Creation

B.

'

and Use of Fake Offshore "Parking" Entities

as a

Means for Selling

Unregistered Securities in the US.
In another abuse of Regulation S. a

created as a

means

phoney offshore "parking"

for an issuer or distributor to directly profit

entity has often

from the

sale

been

of the

unregistered securities back into the US.

Under such a scheme, Regulation S
offshore shell companies formed, in

many

is

stated as the basis for selling securities to

cases,

by the issuer or

distributor.^^

offshore shells then hold the securities for the restricted period before selling

'*

"
''^

In re

Alex Brown

D. Lohse,

&

Sons,

Inc.,

NASD Regulators

No.CMS 960084

Fine Alex Brown,

Problematic Practices Under Regulation

FR

AWC

WALL

S, Securities

The

them

into

(NASD)

ST.J., Oct.

1,

1996,

at

C13

Act Release No. 33-7190, 17 C.F.R. Part 231. 60

35663, 35664 June 27 1995 [hereinafter Problematic Practices Release]
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make

the US. The proceeds of the sale then

manner, to the issuer or

their

way, either in a direct or indirect

distributor.

The SEC, however, has taken

the

view

that

such transactions do not

come within

Regulation S because they are "nothing more than sham offshore transactions structured
no

to

evade the Securities Act registration requirements'".

Inc.

^ Softpoint was charged by the

participating in a

registered in the

SEC

number of transactions

US, and then

''dressed

Softpoint.

By doing

so, Softpoint

by the offshore distributors back
claimed as being from product

SEC

v Softpoint

with a variety of violations, including
that sold Regulation S securities that

were not

up" the proceeds as earnings from corporate

In order for this to take place, the

securities to offshore distributors

In the case

SEC

sales.

alleged that Softpoint issued Regulation S

who

in fact

was

able to indirectly control the sale of the securities

into the

had been either formed or controlled by

US. The earnings received were

fictitiously

sales.

In the Softpoint case the court noted that Regulation S only provided a safe harbor

for

""bona fide" overseas transactions,

Preliminary Note

2.

in

keeping with the intention expressed in

Regulation S was not a mechanism for foreign securities

distributions to evade the registration requirements of Regulation S. Therefore,

it

was

held that Softpoint did not undertake bona fide offshore transactions, and therefore could
not rely on the safe harbor provisions of Regulation S.

''Id.
^*

SEC

''Id.

''Id

V Softpoint Inc,

SEC

Litigation Release No. 14480, 59

SEC Docket 426

(S.D.N. Y. Apr.27 1995)

24
Q

In another case. United States v

to profit

from the

of Regulation S

sale

t

Sung

,

an offshore

securities.

was created

shell

This case was notable as

time a criminal conviction was imposed for fraud involving Regulation

S.

it

in order

was

the

first

Both the

former chairman and his associate were convicted.
For a three month period in 1992, the chairman of Sung saw that over
shares of unregistered

common

.4

million

stock were issued, pursuant to Regulation S. in the

of a 95 year old woman, presumably
controlled by the associate.

1

at a

name

discount to their trading price. This account

The chairman

also

saw

that a further

1

.2

was

million shares were

issued to seven shell entities he controlled in the Bahamas. After doing so. the chairman

then proceeded to stimulate the price upwards by issuing deceiving financial statements
0">

and untrue press statements.

When

'

the share price

chairman and his associates, they then proceeded

was deemed high enough by

to sell the stock in the U.S.

the

market for

around $5.5 million.

The Use of Promissory Notes

C.

in

Purchasing Regulation

Expectation of Repayment Stems from the Regulation
U.S.

S Securities when

S Securities back

the

into the

Market

Yet another situation where Regulation S abuses have occurred involves the use of
Promissory Notes. In

this situation,

an offshore investor would purchase discounted

Regulation S shares after signing a promissory note that was interest free and short term

SEC
"^

Id

''Id

at

Litigation Release

2275

No.

1

490

1

.

6

1

SEC Docket 2275 (M.D.FIa May

6

1

996)
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in nature. After the expiration

days), the offshore investor

of the restricted period (which in most cases was 40

would

sell

the shares into the U.S. market.

With the money

received from the sale, the promissory note could be paid off, and then any amount

left

over (which there was in most cases because the shares were usually discounted from the
prevailing market price

when

investor. In essence, this

originally sold offshore)

meant not only

nothing, but that they were

making a

In the case In the Matter

brought by the

SEC

against the

the offshore

that the foreign investors received the shares for

of the transaction as well.

profit out

ofCandie

two

would be profited by

's.

Inc.

administrative proceedings were

issuers involved (a

women's footwear company and

security company), a law firm and also the head of a brokerage.

a

The proceedings were

brought for "alleged violations of the securities laws involving the use of promissory
notes in the purchase of Regulation S securities".^" Here, the issuers sold shares by

seeking the Regulation S exemptions, via both a law firm and a brokerage firm to foreign
investors at a discount. In return, the foreign companies granted short term, unsecured

promissory notes. At the conclusion of the appropriate restricted period, the stock was
sold

by the foreign companies back

into the

US

via the brokerage firm, and the

promissory notes were paid off by a part of the proceeds of the
Here, the

SEC

found the offerings were

in fact a

intention of avoiding registration, and thus found

"^
"*
*''

Securities Act Release
Id. at

759

Id. at

761

No. 7263. 61

SEC Docket 758

sale.^^

scheme designed with the

them not

(Feb.21 1996)

to

be offers and sales of

26

The foreign

securities protected

by Regulation

engaged essentially

to provide protection for the sale

This case was significant because
Regulation S, the

SEC

S.

it

participants

were found

to

have been

of unregistered securities

marked one of the

earliest cases

US.

in the

where, under

found that the regulation was violated, in spite of there being no

fraud or violation of the regulation itself Instead, the

SEC viewed

the transactions as

being schemes "to evade the registration requirements of the federal securities

^^

laws'".

This interpretation was reached by an examination of Preliminary Note 2 of Regulation

D.

The Use of the Resale Safe Harbor

to

S.

"Wash Off' Restrictions from Otherwise

Restricted Securities

Another example of how investors use the Resale Safe Harbor
restrictions placed

on Regulation S

investors take securities

which are

securities

restricted

to

"wash

under the restricted period

off" the

is

where

and cannot be sold publicly within the U.S.

and then, relying on the provisions relating to the resale safe harbor,

sell

the securities

offshore.

In

its

then forbade
so as to

"Problematic Practices Release"

it

on the grounds

"wash off any

,

the

SEC

outlined such a practice and

that the resale safe harbor could not

restrictions

on

resale.

In

its

release, the

be used in such a

SEC

way

stated that "if a

person with restricted securities sold the securities in an offshore transaction and replaced

*'

Id at 763
See supra note 77
"''/t^. at 35671
**
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them with a repurchase of fungible
acted as a replacement

would

unrestricted securities"

in fact

,

then the securities which

be subjected to the same restrictions as those they

replaced.

The Use of Hedging as a Means

E.

Purchases Under Regulation
Yet another way

in

to

Lock

S

which Regulation S was subjected

known

as "short-selling"^', hedging occurs

certain

amount of Regulation S

instantaneously

investor

sell short the

would "lock

due

abuse was via hedging. Also

stocks, usually at a significant discount,

same shares

in" the difference

to the restricted period.

to

where an overseas investor would buy a

for the

market price.

By

and then would

doing

so. the offshore

between the discounted price and the market

same time not being subjected

price, while at the

Discounted

in Profits Associated with

to

any of the

risks involved with waiting

At the time when the offshore investor closes out the short

positions (at the conclusion of the restricted period) the Regulation S shares are then sold

back into the

US

for the

market price, with the proceeds of this sale being used to cover

the short positions by purchasing the

practice

is

known

same number of shares

at the

market

price.

Such a

as a "wash".

"'Id.
''

investor sells a security that he does not own but is committed to repurchase
borrow stock from willing broker-dealers then the investors sell the borrowed
stock in the marketplace. Later, investors must replace the borrowed stock either through purchases of the
stock on the open market or, as in the GFL Ultra scenario, through Regulation S stock purchased earlier
once the stock becomes eligible for trades in the United States.
Investors use short sales to capitalize on an expected decline in a security's price.
Selling short occurs

eventually. Investors

when an

first

28

ofGFL

In the case In the Matter

Ultra Funcf' a British Virgin Islands

investment company operated under a strategy of immediately short selling Regulation S
stocks at a discount.^^

The

strategy specifically involved the purchase of securities of

U.S. issuers at substantial discounts in offshore transactions pursuant to Regulation S and

hedging some or

all

of these transactions through short selling in the United States before

or during the 40 day restricted period applicable to the' Regulation S transactions.

company subsequently unwound

The

these short positions either through covering the short

sales with Regulation S shares themselves, or

by

selling the Regulation S shares in the

U.S. secondary market following the restricted period and purchasing other shares in the

open market

SEC. was
its

profits

to

cover the short positions. The result of such a strategy, according to the

that the

company had

when

took

it

its

a profit at the end of the trading

by

virtue

of it locking

in

short positions.

This transaction was found to have been a violation of the Securities Act. with
particular reliance placed

the

SEC, covering a

5?^ In reaching

which

GFL

on section

short position

this position, the

5. It

was

SEC

came within

the

same

"^

it

view of

as a '"sale" for the purposes of section

also took account of the

Ultra sought to rely on. However,

Section 4(1)

section 5, because, in the

dismissed

all

numerous exemptions

the possible exemptions.

concerning private placements did not apply because the company was a

"statutory underwriter", as defined under section 2(a)(l 1) of the Securities Act^^. This

'^

Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-9333, 64

SEC Docket

1958 (June

18,

1997)

''Id.

15 U.S.C.

s

77d(l) (1994). This section exempts transactions by any person other than an issuer,

underwriter or dealer from the provisions of section
''

15 U.S.C

s77b(ll) (1994)

5.
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section defines an underwriter as including "any person

who

has purchased securities

from an issuer with a "view" towards the "distribution" of the

GFL

securities''^^.

Therefore.

Ultra could not use section 4(1) in order to gain any form of exemption.

The

GFL

Ultra case also reiterated earlier

Practices Release that such trading

SEC comments

in the Problematic

was unacceptable. The SEC observed

that "a trading

pattern of short selling in the United States in connection with purchasing a Regulation S

offering,

which

essentially locks in a profit

However
former
that the

the

GFL

Ultra case

SEC Commissioner,

Steve

is

.

.

.

runs counter to the goals of Regulation

also notable for the significant dissent that the

Wallman made. He was of the opinion

Fund's transactions took place, there was too

much confusion

as to the

Commission's position on the hedging of securities (such as short term
Regulation S, especially given the fact that
Practices Release, the

opinion, he

felt that

However

at the

Fund had already stopped

that at the time

sales)

under

time of the issuance of the Problematic

the hedging practices. Therefore, in his

such retroactive, "after the fact" enforcement was not appropriate.^*^

in spite

of the

GFL

Ultra case, the question

still

remained as to whether

individuals could also be liable for hedging or short selling securities

which came under

Regulation S, as the case did not deal directly with this issue.

'^

The term "person"

is

defined

in section 2(a)(2)

of the Securities Act as including "a corporation". The

SEC

found that the shares here were "distributed" because a substantial number flowed into the U.S trading
markets and came to rest in the hands of the investing public. See n. 12
''*

In the

1958

at

Matter of GFL Ultra Fund Ltd., Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-9333, 64

1960 (June

18,

1997)

SEC Docket

30
In

illegal,

summary, while
it is

it

clear that the

is

not clear whether or not the

Commission did not

like this

SEC

intended to

use of Regulation

make hedging
S.

Thus, this

case serves as a warning to Regulation S offering participants that hedging transactions

have been identified as being inconsistent with the policies underlying the Securities Act
and

may

enforcement actions.

in fact represent a basis for

Marketplace Concerns About Regulation S
It

would be

incorrect to say that the

against those

who

numerous enforcement actions bought by the SEC

breached Regulation S were the only reason for bringing about a

general dissatisfaction with the Regulation. Over time, there have also been a

concerns arising in the market generally about the workings of Regulation S
follows below

is

a discussion of

number of
.

What

some of these concerns.

A. Discounted Shares Available Solely to Foreign Purchasers
In

many

cases, shares sold under Regulation S are sold to offshore buyers at a discount to

those available in the market. Unregistered securities falling under Regulation S can be

""*

For example see

SEC

v.

Ari

Fames

et al.

Litigation Release

No.

1

6877, Jan. 3

1

,

200

1

.

The SEC charged

defendants with a fraudulent manipulation scheme. The defendants issued $3.6 million of convertible

Immunogen debentures under Regulation S to five Panamanian companies with a post office box in
However the debentures never left the United States as they were held by an attorney of one of
the defendants in New York. By selling short 1.7 million of the shares, and through other market
manipulative techniques, the defendants drove down Immunogen's stock price. The defendants then
Switzerland.

common stock at a discount to the market price (which they had
and then used the stock to cover their short positions. By doing so they illegally
distributed the securities in the U.S. and produced millions of dollars of illegal profits.
converted the Regulation S debentures into
artificially depressed),
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sold for any price to foreign investors. This discounting usually

comes about because

Regulation S shares cannot be issued to U.S. investors.

Discounts are justified by promoters and issuers because of the restricted period

which the foreign investors have

to w^ait

in

with their securities before they can do anything

with them, and the ensuing risk which the foreign investors must bear while waiting. In
other cases, discounting occurs

their share price in order to

acknowledged

that

when

become

a

company

is

unable to raise funds without reducing

attractive to offshore investors.

some discounts may be justified,

foreign investors have to run'

".

many domestic

While

it

is

especially given the risks that

U.S. investors have formed the opinion

that such discounts are not only unfair, but advantageous to foreign investors at their

expense.

"^^

In

price

some

- meaning

cases. Regulation S shares

that the

were sold

B.

Lack of Disclosure

Up

until the latter stages

offerings.

'°"^

for

up

to

50%

less than the

market

market price would have to virtually collapse within the 40 day

restricted period before the offshore investor

'"^

own

of 1996, the

SEC

would

lose

money on

the transaction.'^"^

did not require disclosure of Regulation S

This meant that until this time, domestic investors were largely unaware of

The SEC has recognized

that

"some discounts may well be warranted

in

order to compensate for the

length of the restricted period, historic volatility of the stock, financial condition of the issuer, the dilution

represented by the newly issued shares, current market condition, availability of current information as to
the issuer, information the issuer

may have had

that

was disclosed

to the purchaser but not otherwise

disclosed to the market, or other factors." Problematic Practices Release, supra 77 at n.l4
'"^

Scholl, supra note 73

•"^

/d
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many

Regulation S offerings.

The 1996

release required reporting issuers to report

'°^
offerings within 15 days of their occurrence.

issuers are involved,

place.

In

to

will not be apparent

when

reporting

a Regulation S transaction has taken

There will merely be an unexplained increase

many

due

it

However even today when non

in the

company's shares outstanding.

cases, because of the domestic investors" lack of knowledge, they sustain losses

an unexpected decline

situations

when

in the share value.

The share value declines

the foreign investors sell their shares in the

restricted period,

unbeknown

to

market

at the

end of the

domestic investors, thus increasing the amount of shares

available in the marketplace. Occasionally

transaction having taken place,

US

in these

'^^

and

this

knowledge leaks out of a Regulation S
too has the effect of reducing the share price in

the market.

C

Dilutive Effects as a result of the

Flow of Regulation S Securities Back

into the

US

Market
Tied in closely with a lack of knowledge of a Regulation S offering having taken place
the dilutive effect associated with the flow of Regulation S shares back into the

market. The share price decline can best be explained by simple supply and
analysis. For if

an issuer increases

its

issued capital by issuing

more

necessarily implies that the value of each existing share declines.

being unaware of the Regulation S offering,

"*^
See Periodic Reporting of Unregistered Equity
Docket 2762, 2763 (Oct. 8, 996)
1

106

Id. at

88,701

1

when

Sales,

is

US

demand

shares, then this

With domestic

the foreign purchaser

issuers

comes out of the

Exchange Act Release No. 37801, 62 SEC

restricted period

and then chooses

to sell the shares

on the

US

supply of shares usually leads to a drop in share price. This
investor has had a chance to find out about

'"'

Scholl. supra note 73

it.

all

market, the increased

occurs before the domestic

CHAPTER FIVE
Events Leading up

to the

Amendment

of Regulation S

Given the combination of discounting, the lack of disclosure and the
coupled with the abuses that took place,

used

in a

at the

manner detrimental

it

is

to the interests

possible to see

how

of the investors

same time creating unintended opportunities

it

dilutive effects,

Regulation S could be

was

set

up

to protect

while

for astute offshore investors.

Furthermore, Regulation S helped subvert the general principles underlying the U.S.
securities regime.

lead to the recent

What follows below
amendments

to

an examination of the events and criticisms that

is

Regulation

S.

Developing Criticism of the Regulation
1

Starting in 1994 with

way

media coverage

Regulation S was headed

,

OS

and

SEC murmurings

of displeasure with the

Edward Markey, Chair of the House Energy and

Commerce Telecommunications and Finance subcommittee wrote
that year requesting they report to

to the

SEC

in April

of

Congress regarding the repeal or modification of

Regulations.'"^

'"*

Scholl. supra note 73. This

Regulation

is

one such example of media commentary concerning the operation of

S.

'"'
SEC's Walter Highlights Concern over Application of Regulation S, 26 SEC. REG &
366 (Mar. 11,1994).
"" Markey Seeks Report on Regulation S. 26 SEC. REG. & L. REP (BNA) 636 (Apr 29,

34

L.

1

REP. (BNA)

997)
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In a response to

Markey,

SEC

Chairman, Arthur Levitt did verify that the

was conscious of the abuses." and
'

that the

SEC

SEC's review could see the updating of the

regulation to take account of the abuses or increase

its

enforcement provisions against

such abuses.

Problematic Practices Release
"^
1

In

its

release referred to as "Problematic Practices under Regulation S"

outlined

its

assessment of violations of Regulation

!

""

the

SEC

S. In particular, the release

concentrated on Preliminary Note 2 of the original Regulation S stating that the

regulation

was not

available '"with respect to any transaction or series of transactions that,

although in technical compliance [with the regulation] was part of a plan or scheme to

evade the registration provisions of the Acf"."^

Thus

in the report, the

SEC

noted that there were cases in which securities were

being placed overseas in order to escape the registration requirements, and commented
that such dealings

were contrary

to Preliminary

Note

2.

The

report listed the use of bogus

offshore shell companies, the improper use of promissory notes, hedging of Regulation S

securities

purchased

transactions

at

a discounted rate and the "washing

which breached Regulation

off of restrictions

as

S."**

'"

Id., referring to Letter from Arthur Lewitt, SEC Chairman, to Edward Markey, Chair of House of
Energy and Commerce Telecommunications and Finance (May 6, 1994).
"^ Problematic Practices Release, supra note 77, at 35,664
"' Original
Regulation S, supra note 1, at Preliminary Note 2

"^ Problematic Practices Release, supra note 77,

at 35,

664
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In issuing

problems.

It

its

release, the

SEC

also sought input on

deal with such

sought suggestions relating to a possible extension of the 40 day period to a

one year period, and whether category three
securities.

how to

restrictions should

be placed on category two

Also requiring comment was whether or not there should be some limit

imposed on the amount of discounting available
Finally discussion

was encouraged regarding

to securities

restrictions

coming under Regulation

S.

on hedging and the use of

promissory notes.

Fifteen

Day Reporting Requirement

for Regulation S Offerings

In response to the lack of disclosure requirements under Regulation S. the

October 1996 brought into effect amendments

to the reporting

issuers

S.

The

effect

of this was that

coming within Regulation S had

to

all

offerings

in

forms of the Exchange

Act, by requiring domestic, reporting issuers to disclose any offerings

Regulation

SEC

made under

made by domestic

be disclosed on a form

known

reporting

as

Form

8-K."''

This had to be undertaken within 15 days of the offering having taken place.

Proposed Amendments

to

Regulation S

After receiving submissions, the
I

S

in

February of 1997.

I

K

SEC

published

its

proposed amendments to Regulation

Here, the Commission advocated extending the restricted period

''^

Id. at 35,665
"* Periodic Reporting of Unregistered Equity Sales, supra note 105.

'''id. at

at

2763

2764

"" Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-7392. 17 C.F.R. Parts 228,229,230 and
249,
62 Fed. Reg. 9258, February 28 1997. [hereinafter Proposed Amendments Release].
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for

two years

market

in the

for domestic issuers and also for foreign issuers

who had

a principal

U.S."^ The rationale behind the extended two year period was to adjust the

restricted period to coincide with the restricted period

proposed amendments release, the
requirements to

SEC

under Rule 144'"°. Also in

this

suggested extending the stricter category three

equity securities of domestic issuers and foreign issuers with a

all

principal market for their securities in the U.S.

In order to achieve this, the

SEC

intended that a

Regulation S to reclassify such securities

""

to

new

section be added to

come within Rule

also intended to prohibit promissory notes being used as a

144.

~^

The Commission

method of payment

for

Regulation S securities, and further, that purchasers of Regulation S securities would

have

to agree not to participate in

Responses
the measure

to the

would put a

had gone too

any hedging of such

new measures proposed were
halt to the abuses, others

far to the other

'"'*

securities.

varied.'""^

While the

formed the opinion

SEC

that the

believed

measures

extreme and would be too restrictive for issuers attempting

to raise capital via Regulation S.'^^

"V^.

at

9260

'^''

17 C.F.R.s 230.144 (1996)

'^'

Proposed Amendments Release supra note 118, at 9260-9262
i.e. equity securities of domestic issuers and foreign issuers with a principal market for their securities

122

the U.S.

'" Proposed Amendments Release, supra note
'" Id at 9262-9263. 9265
'^'

See as examples the

letter

from

AIMR

1

1

8. at

9263

(Association for Investment

Management and Research)
J McLaughlins

http://w\vw.aimr.org/professionalism/advocacv/97/commltr/offshore/html and
httD://204.192.28.3/rules/Droposed/s7897/mciaughl.htm
*

Id.,

with particular reference to the McLaughlin

letter.

letter

in

CHAPTER SIX

Amendments

to

Regulation S

Actual amendments to Regulation S were adopted by the

came

into force

that they

were "'designed

that the area subject to

to stop the abusive practices in connection with the offerings

Therefore,

it

made

1

in reliance

on Regulation S".

most violation concerned the equity
is

Regulation S concerning

98

The

securities

of

release also noted

of domestic

not surprising that there have been significant changes to

this area.

Domestic reporting equity
fall

10 February 1998. and

on 27 April 1998.'^^ When issuing the amendments, the SEC observed

equity securities purportedly

issuers.'"

SEC on

securities

under the third issuer safe harbor.

'

were reclassified under the amendment

to

A new rule which classifies equity securities of

both reporting and nonreporting domestic issuers as restricted securities under Rule
144'"''

was

also added.

'"'

Amending Release, supra note 28. See also Regulation S - Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made
Outside the United States Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. ss230.901 230.905, (1998) [hereinafter Amended Regulation S].
'^*

Amending

'^''

Id. at

""

9632

Release, supra note 28, at 9632.
-

9633

Amended Regulation
9634-9633.
"'

Id. at

S,

supra note 124,

at

s230. 903(b)(3), and

S230.905 and 9636 respectively

38

Amending

Release, supra note 28, at

39

However

foreign issuers with a principal market for their securities in the

did not have any further restriction imposed upon them

abuse in

-

US

the reason being the lack of

132

this area.

General Statement

is

The general statement,

Not affected by the Amendments
as under Rule 901. did not undergo any

amendments,

in that

it

continued to state that offers and sales of securities that take place outside of the U.S. and
that satisfy Regulation

S will continue to be exempted from the registration requirements

of section 5 of the Securities Act.'

Amendments

to the Issuer

and Resale Safe Harbors

Generally speaking, the amendments changed the classifications of the securities that

came under

A.

the different safe harbor categories.

Amendments

to the

Two General Conditions of an Offshore Transaction and No

Directed Selling Efforts in the United States

The two general conditions remain

for both issuer

and resale safe harbors.'

^

Definitional

changes are the main differences between the original Regulation S and the amended
version.

'^^

The category of "designated offshore markets" has been expanded

Amending

Release, supra note 28,

at

9633 and Proposed Amendments Release, supra note

-9263.
'"

Amended

'" Id

at ss

to include

Regulation S, supra note 127,

at s

230.901.

230.903 (a)(lH2), 230.904 (a)(l)-(2)

II 8, at

9260

40
markets that had been designated after the adoption of the original Regulation
definitions of "directed selling efforts" have

make them more

Regulation S.

B.

The

been changed within the Regulation so as

succinct, although directed selling efforts

which prepare the U.S market

S.'^''

for the offering

still

embrace any

to

efforts

and selling of securities through

136

Amendments

to the Issuer

The main change with

Safe Harbor

respect to the issuer safe harbor

domestic reporting issuers. Such securities were

was

moved

to equity securities

of

into the third issuer safe harbor

137

while the same type of securities of foreign issuers remained in the second category.

There were also some

Changes

/.

The

first

to

slight definitional

changes

138

Category One

issuer safe harbor continues to apply to the securities of offshore issuers

who do

not have a substantial U.S. market interest for their securities. '^^ to securities sold in

"overseas directed offerings",

"'
'^'

Id. at s

230.902(b)

Id. at s

230.902(c)

"^ Id
'^*

'^'

at s

'''°

securities

backed by a foreign government'"*' and foreign

230.903(b)(2)-(3)

Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9638
Amended Regulation S. supra note 127, at

""/c/.

ats230.903(b)(l)(ii)

'"M

ats230.903(b)(l)(iii)

s

230.903(b)(l)(i)

41

employee benefit
are the

plans.

'''^

All that securities falling into this category have to satisfy

two general conditions of Regulation
There have been no changes

However, equity

securities

S.

to the definitions

of category one

securities.

of domestic issuers falling under category one that have been

sold to foreign employees according to employee benefit plans controlled by foreign law

have

now been

a result

reclassified to be restricted securities

of this, such securities are

now

fall

under Rule 144. As

under the limitations of a one year restricted

period before being able to be resold into the U.S.,

had no such

and instead

as

restrictions other than the general category

opposed

to in the past

when

they

one requirements imposed on

them.

Changes

//.

Category Two

coming within category two have changed

Securities

Regulation
category

to

S.

significantly

from the original

Equity securities of domestic reporting issuers are no longer in this

- having been moved

to category three instead'"^^

,

while securities of foreign

reporting issuers having a substantial market interest for their issuings in the U.S., debt

securities

of reporting domestic and foreign nonreporting issuers are included

amended category

two.'"*^

"^/o'.

ats230.903(b)(l)(iv)

'"^M

at s

230.903(b)(1)

at s

230.903.

""•

Id

'*'

Amended

supra note 8
'"^

Amended

in the

Amending

Release, supra note 28. at 9634

supra note 127,

at s

230.903(b)(2)-(3) and compare with Adopting Release,

230.903(c )(2)
Regulation S, supra note 127,

at s

230.903(b)(2)

Regulation

S,

at s

42
For those securities which are under category two, the two general conditions

must

still

be satisfied (that there

selling efforts in the U-S.).'"*'

is

an offshore transaction and that there are no directed

Category two securities must also satisfy the transactional

requirements - namely a 40 day restricted period where the securities cannot be sold to or
for the benefit

this period

same

of a U.S.

still

need

person.'"*^ Distributors selling to securities professionals

to provide the purchaser

definitional aspect

worth noting

referred to in the original Regulation S

period".

The

is

that the

now known
it

term

"'restricted

period" as

as the "distribution

it

was

compliance

always was - instead the term used to identify

has been changed so as to avoid any confusion between the terms "restricted period"

remained the

securities".

to

Id. at s

"* Id

at s

is still

now also

pertinent to

all

equity and debt falling within the earlier

includes the equity securities of domestic reporting issuers.

230.903(a)
230.903(b)(2)(ii)

Id. at ss

offers

it

offering restrictions of category two, however, have

Category Three

While category three
categories,

The

same.''*^

Changes

Hi.

'''

is

actual definition remains as

and "restricted

'"•^

with notice that they too are subject to the

restrictions as the distributor.

One

it

during

230.902(g), 230.903(b)(2)(i). This means that distributors

still

and sales made before the end of the distribution compliance period

that all offering materials used regarding the sale

must agree
will fall

of Regulation S securities

in

in

writing that both

under Regulation S and

the distribution compliance

period also have to contain statements to the effect that the securities have not been registered and cannot

be sold

in

the U.S. or to U.S. persons unless they have been registered first or granted an exemption.
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domestic nonreporting issuers and foreign nonreporting issuers

market

interest in the U.S. for their securities.

Because of the higher probabiUty

two

a substantial

'^°

that category three securities will

the U.S.. the procedures surrounding such securities are

the earlier

who have

categories.'^' Categor\' three securities

flow back into

more demanding than those

must not only

for

two

satisfy the

general conditions but they are also subjected to a series of rigorous transactional and
offering restrictions that have been changed since the original Regulation S.''"

The

transactional restrictions

securities.'^

The

make

a distinction between debt and equity

restrictions for debt securities

original Regulation

S,''^"^

and they continue

to

remain the same as they were under the

have a 40 day distribution compliance

period.'" Debt securities also have to satisfy this 40 day restriction.'^^

The

transactional restrictions as applied to category three securities are

stringent under the

must

still

satisfy a

purchasers

citizens

and

They must
resale

'•'^''

"'

'"

who

must

amended Regulation

Equity securities falling under category three

one year distribution compliance period.'" During

are not distributors

must

this time,

certify that they are not U.S. residents or

that they are not obtaining the securities for the benefit

of a U.S. person.

also agree that if the securities in question are to be resold, then

fall

within the requirements of Regulation S, be registered or

Amended Regulation S, supra note
Amending Release, supra note 28,
Amended Regulation S, supra note

'" Id

S.

127, at
at

s

230.903(b)(3)

s

230.902(g), 230.903(b)(3)

9635

127, at

at s 230.903(b)(3)(ii)-(iii)

''''

Id. at s

230.903(b)(3)(ii). See also Adopting Release, supra note 9, at s 230.903(c)(3)

'"

Amended

'*'•

Id

at s

230.903(b)(3)(ii)(A) and

'" Id

at s

230.903(b)(3)(iii)(A)

Regulation

S,

supra note 127,
s

at s

more

230.903(b)(3)(ii)(A)

230.903(b)(3)(ii)(B)

any such

fall

within

"
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another exemption to the Securities Act requirements.'^^ Purchasers also have to agree
to not partake in

such hedging

is

any transactions involving hedging of the Regulation S

securities, unless

"in compliance with the Act".'^

Category three transactional requirements also require that there be an inscription

on the

securities

of domestic issuers providing that transfers of such securities are

prohibited, unless the transfer

in

is

accordance with Regulation

also state that hedging with such securities

with the Act".'^^ The issuer too

is

does not comply with Regulation
category three must

same

still

legally

S.'^'*

S.'^'

The

must not take place "unless

bound

'^^

to refuse to register

in

inscription

compliance

any transfer

Finally, distributors selling securities

provide notice to purchasers that the purchaser

is

must

that

under

subject to the

restrictions as the seller was.'^^

The amendments

to category three essentially strengthened the transactional

requirements by requiring a statement to the effect of prohibiting hedging activities
during the distribution compliance period unless they are in line with the Act

Such a position

is

consistent with the
'^'^

Problematic Practices Release

'*
''"

Id. at s

230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(l)

Id. at s

230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)

and

Commission's
in the

GFL

earlier statements in

'^^

itself.

both the

Ultra case.'^^

'"'Id
'" Id at

s

230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(3)

•" Id
its bylaws or some other comparable document.
supra note 127, at s 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(4)

Either by contract, provision in
164

Amended

'" Id
"' Id

Regulation

S,

at s

230.903(b)(3)(iv)

at s

230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)-(3)

"^ Problematic Practices Release, supra note 70
"*''

In the

Matter of GFL Ultra Fund Ltd., Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-9333, 64

1958 (June

18,

1997)

SEC Docket
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The amendments

to Regulation

S also made changes to the offering restrictions

relating to category three domestic equity securities. Distributors

that all offers

comply with

to agree in writing

and sales made before the end of the distribution compliance period must

the Regulation.

that they will not undertake

issuers unless

have

it is

in

'^^

Distributors are

now also

required to provide in writing

hedging transactions with equity securities of domestic

compliance with the Act.'^° As with the original version,

documents and materials

relating to the offer

all

and sale of any category three securities are

required to contain statements to the effect that the securities have not been registered and

that they

may

not be offered or sold within the U.S. or to U.S. persons. Offering

materials of equity securities of domestic issuers must also state that hedging

is

prohibited with respect to those securities, unless in accordance with the Act.

C.

Changes

to the

Resale Safe Harbor and New Rule 905

While there were few changes
to classify

to the

Rule 904 under the

Resale Safe Harbor

Amended

Regulation S

resale of unregistered securities

'*''

™
'"

Amended
Id.

Regulation

S,

ats230.902(g)(l)(ii)

Id. at s

"^ Id

at s

Rule 905 was introduced so as

domestic equity securities as restricted securities within Rule 144.

Changes

i.

to the resale safe harbor,

230.902(g)(2)

230.905

still

provides a safe harbor for the offshore

by any person apart from the

supra note 127,

at s

230.903(g)(l)(i)

issuer, distributor or their

46
agents and

affiliates.

no directed

'^^

The general conditions (namely of an offshore transaction and

selling efforts in the

US)

still

remain.

However there have been new
'*

conditions which at times apply to dealers and their affiliates.'

New Rule 905

a.

Termed "Resale

Limitations", the

restricted classification,

"washing off

and also

restrictions

new Rule 905

it

gives domestic equity securities a

forbids using the resale safe harbor as a

from these

securities.

Rule 905 also

tries to

way of

prevent the

misuse of promissory notes with respect to Regulation S securities through Rule

Domestic Equity Securities are

1.1

now Classified

Securities Within the

144.'^''

Meaning of

Rule 144'^^

Under

the

amendments

to Regulation S,

Rule 905 was introduced and Rule 144 was

modified so as to categorize domestic equity securities from both reporting and non
reporting entities as restricted securities.

'^^

Rule 905

states that

such domestic equity

securities acquired in an offer or a sale that is subjected to Regulation S requirements

will be considered restricted securities,

and thus will

fall

within Rule 144.

the equity securities of domestic issuers will be subject to

'"
^^*
''^
'^''

'^'
'^*

Id. at s
Id.

all

Therefore,

the requirements of Rule

230.904(a)

ats230.904(a)(lH3)

Id

at s

17

C.F.Rs 230.144 (1997)

230.905

Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9636, and Amended Regulation
Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.905

S,

supra note 127,

at s

230.905
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144, including the one year holding period before such securities are able to be

"onsold".'^^

1

.2

Resales of Domestic Equity Securities not Eliminating the Restricted Securities
Classifications

Rule 905 stops investors from washing off restrictions by the means of the resale safe
harbor by providing that restricted securities defined under Rule 144 "will continue to

be deemed to be restricted securities notwithstanding that they were acquired in a resale

by means of the

transaction"

1

.3

As

resale safe harbor.

The Effect of Rule 905 on Promissory Notes
a result of classifying domestic equity securities as being restricted securities under

Rule 144. the use of promissory notes has been forbidden for purchasing Regulation S
securities in cases

where repayment

for promissory notes

the Regulation S securities into the U.S.

came about by

the resale of

With Rule 144 now being applicable

domestic equity securities, the one year restricted period

is

tolled

to

until particular

conditions are met.
In particular the one year restricted period under Rule 144 for purchasers will not

begin unless the promissory note "provides

and

securities;"

'" 17 C.F.R.
'*"
'*'

s

"is

full

recourse against the purchaser of the

secured by collateral, other than the securities purchased, having a

230. 144(d)(l)( 1997)

Amended

Regulation

"Tolling''

means

S,

supra note 127,

at s

230.905

that the holding period will not begin to run until the conditions are satisfied.

s
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fair

market value

at least

Another new addition

equal to the purchase price of the securities purchased."

to Regulation

S

is

that

even after the restricted period has been

completed, before any resale of the security can take place,

promissory note must have occurred.
securities

'^"^

As

full

payment

for the

a result of this, offshore buyers cannot

buy

under Regulation S by promissory notes and then fund the payment of the

notes from the proceeds of reselling the Regulation S securities into the U.S.

Other Changes

to the

Amendments

Other amendments to Regulation S saw the introduction of a quarterly reporting period
for domestic issuers

and made modifications regarding convertible

Reporting of Regulation

A.

S

Transactions

Because the distribution compliance period, or
days to a year for domestic issuers,
sale

this

meant

restricted period,

that there

was extended from 40

was not much of a need

1

5

day reporting

requirement and instead made reporting necessary every quarter.

'^^'

'^^

17 C.F.Rs 230.144(d)(2) (1997)
Id ats230.144(d)(2)(i)(ii)

'*•*

Id

'*^

Amending

'"*

Id

'"''

for the

of such securities to be reported within 15 days of any offering taking place. Thus

followed that the amendments to Regulation S removed the

'"^

securities.

at s 230.144(d)(2)(iii).

at

See also Amending Release, supra note 28,

at

9637

Release, supra note 28, at 9638

9634.

In line with

Form 8-K under

the Securities

Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.

ss

78a- 78gg (1994)

it
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Convertible Securities

B.

Regulation S convertible debentures came about because they could be converted to

common

stock quickly and could be sold in the U.S. market almost immediately. This

eliminated

some of the

risk

amendment, were required

of holding Regulation S
to

be held for a

common

minimum of 40

shares,

which up

until the

days. Investors purchased

convertible bonds in anticipation of receiving interest payments while waiting for the

stock price to appreciate.

When

would then convert

investors

the stock price

had increased above a specific

price, the

their bonds.

Regulation S convertible debentures had a conversion price that was usually set

by taking the average price of the

securities for the five days leading

up

to the

conversion date. Often, the issuer would also give an extra discount from the final
conversion price so that the lower the price of the stock being purchased, the better the
situation

would be

In

many

for the convertible debenture investors.

cases, share prices

had a "mysterious habit of dipping"

'^"^

just prior to

the debentures being converted. This not only resulted in suspicions arising about the

use of convertible debentures with respect to Regulation S securities, but
in offshore

debenture holders gaining significant bargains. Consequently,

companies refused

to

honor conversion rights on

dealing with these problems the

""'

J

Scholl Pirates Play,

''"Id
'''Id

BARRON'S,

SEC

this

stated that the

Jan. 6,

1997

form of convertible

new

restrictions

it

also resulted

many
security.'^" In

and classifications

50
regarding domestic equity securities would also be applicable to convertible
•

•

secunties.

'"

191

Amending

Release, supra note 28, at 9634

i

CHAPTER SEVEN
Probable Impacts of Amendments on Regulation S

It

has been a

little

over two and a half years since the amendments to Regulation S came

into effect. Therefore there has

been

little litigation

negligible evidence of the effects of the

assessments and predictions as to

regarding the

new amendments and

amendments. What follows are some

how the new amendments may address some of the

issues raised throughout the thesis.

A. Probable Effect of the Amendments on the Cost of Raising Capital under

Regulation

S

Because of the increased compliance measures - such as
record keeping, which

all result

amendments would have

in a cost

of some form -

certification,

it

seems

legending and

likely that the

the effect of increasing the cost of raising capital under

Regulation S for domestic reporting issuers.
Also, extending the holding period for the equity securities of domestic
reporting issuers will probably result in even greater discounts being given

securities than before the

amendments, with the discounts occurring as a

securities being labeled as restricted.

The

greater discounts

51

would

on such

result

likely lead to

of those

52
domestic reporting issuers selling even larger amounts of securities in order to raise the

same amount of capital.
Therefore, because of these two factors, issuers

securities

the

under the onerous Section

5 or seek other

may

instead end

exemptions as opposed to satisfying

more strenuous requirements of the amended Regulation
However,

it

seems there should be

little

up registering

S.

change financially for domestic

nonreporting issuers and foreign issuers after the amendments to Regulation S. and
these classes of issuer will probably continue to use Regulation S.

Probable Impacts of Amendments on Regulator} Abuses
While the abuses concerning the use of promissory notes and the use of the resale safe
harbor to "wash" off restrictions have been dealt with explicitly by the amendments to

Regulation S'

".

other abuses have not been treated in the

For example, while hedging seems

to

same manner.

be prohibited by changes to both the

offering and transactional requirements of domestic issuers, there does not appear to be

any definition within

either the original regulation or the

new amendments which

defines the prohibition on hedging.

Further, the abuses concerning illegal resales within the restricted period

(i.e.

distribution compliance period) and the use of phoney offshore shell entities, while

always

illegal

See supra

text

under the original regulation, have not been explicitly addressed.

accompanying note

1

66
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Consequently such abuses can conceivably continue under the amendments. The only
difference

is

that they

may be more

difficult to carr>' out.

A. Illegal Resales Within the Distribution Compliance Period
In the future, a

problem

may

arise

concerning the resale of Regulation S securities by

offshore purchasers during the distribution compliance period. With

may

more

offer greater discounts (given that there will be

in question),

likely that issuers

it

restrictions

on the

securities

then there will be even greater motivation for purchasers to '"onsell" the

securities that they

have purchased as soon as possible because they would gain from

selling their discounted securities at the

distribution compliance period.

market price, without waiting out the

Yet the increased safeguards

in the

amended

regulation,

especially with regard to domestic reporting issuers,

make

purchasers to carry out while

compliance period. At the same

still

in the distribution

time, the increased discounts could be

form of buffer so
securities, as the

resale

more

difficult for the

viewed by offshore investors as providing some

that purchasers will be less likely to suffer losses

when

they

sell their

market would have to virtually collapse before the investors would

suffer a loss.

Domestic reporting
that is not

made

in

issuers also are required to register

accordance with Regulation

to

be aware of the possibility that

to

wash off the

'"

Amended

illegal resales

restrictions in the resale transfer

Regulation

S,

supra note 127,

S.'

'

may

any transfer of securities

This means that such issuers have

occur or that there

of the securities.

at s 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(4).

It

may

be attempts

seems therefore

that
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this

new role imposed on

take place.

'^"^

similar to that

issuers will

The SEC commented
which

is

make

that this

it

more

meant

difficult for

issuers

such

now had

illegal resales to

"a monitoring role

often imposed in connection with unregistered private

placements''.'^^ Hopefully this monitoring role of issuers will prevent offshore investors

from

B.

selling before the

end of the distribution compliance period.

Creation and Use of Fake Offshore Shell Entities

With the

distribution compliance period being extended to

one year

it

extended period would reduce some of the motivation for such sham

is

likely that this

entities

being

established with the sole intention of avoiding the provisions of Regulation S.

Category three requires that purchasers of such securities must certify that they
are not U.S. persons

and that they are not acquiring the securities for the account or the

benefit of a U.S. person. '^^

The SEC believed

that

making such a requirement apply

to

equity securities of domestic reporting issuers would help to put an end to

some of the

abuses regarding phoney offshore shell

requirement

will serve as

any deterrent measure

to

entities.

However, whether

such practices remains unclear. Presumably those

involved in the creation of such entities probably already

Regulation

S.

this

knew the

practice

was

against

Consequently any additional notice requirements will probably not deter

the users of such practices.

"^

Amending

Release, supra note 28, at 9636.

'''Id
"^ Amending Release, supra note 28,

at

9636 and Amended Regulation

230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(l). See also Original Regulation S, supra note

"'
"*

Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9636.
Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s

230.902(k)(l)(viii).

1,

S,

at

supra note 127.

at s

s230.903(c)(3)(iii)(B)(l)
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Nonetheless, extending the distribution compliance period to one year would

seem

to act as a disincentive to those using the

Regulation

S.

This

longer time frame.

is

is

entities as a

way of circumventing

because of the greater risk associated with holding securities for a
Also, in

'

sham

many

cases,

where offshore

shells are

manipulated before dumping the shares back into the U.S.

It

used the share price

would seem

difficult to

manipulate the share price for an entire year before reselling the shares back into the
U.S. without being detected either by the

SEC

or the market itself

Use of Promissory Notes

C.

Under

the

amendments

to

Regulation S. the one year holding period for promissory

notes relating to domestic securities

is tolled, this

means

completely paid off before they are able to be resold

whereby

the notes have to be

in the U.S.

the purchaser of a promissory note did not have to

Regulation S securities before onselling them have been

D. Use of the Resale Safe Harbor to "Wash

Consequently schemes

pay anv'thing for the

prohibited.'^*^^

Off Restrictions from

Otherwise

Restricted Securities

By

introducing Rule 905, the

SEC

has

made

it

clear that the resale safe harbor can

no

longer be used as a means of washing off the restriction relating to equity securities of

domestic issuers.

For example the market could

^""nC.F.R
^"'
Amended

fall,

or the

SEC

could discover the phoney

s230. 144(d)(2) (1996)

Regulation

S,

supra note 127.

at s

230.905

set up.
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E.

Hedging

SEC

While the

put anti-hedging provisions in the Category three transactional and

offering restrictions,

it

did not state what transactions were prohibited under Regulation

The SEC even

and what transactions were "in compliance with the Act"."

S

in its release

which accompanied the amendments

on hedging

restrictions

hedging^^^. In

Thus, from this

practices".

SEC v. Ah Parnes'^^

Ultra Fimcf"^ and

GFL

Ultra

it

that they did "not

was found

i't

stated

impose any new

would appear

that the

GFL

cases contain the Commission's view on

that the fund in question

had purchased

Regulation S shares with the intention of distributing them, therefore making the fund a
statutory underwriter

which needed

to register its shares before

Yet with the new provisions
securities agree not to

with the

would

Act"'^^^,

still

it

is

in

Category three

become involved

in

hedging

^"^

resold them.'

which purchasers of such

activities "unless in

compliance

not clear whether purchasers not considered statutory underwriters

be in breach of the regulation via the purchasing agreement.

Also unclear, because of extension of the
to

in

it

one year under the amendments,

is

restricted period

from 40 days previously

whether or not holding such securities (of

230.902(g)(l)(ii), 230.902(g)(2), 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)-(3).

Id. at ss

'''Id.
''*
^"^

Amending
In the

Release, supra note 28, at 9635.

Matter of GFL Ultra Fund, Administrative Proceedings Release, No. 3-9333, 64

1958 (June

18,

^'"'

SEC

'^

See supra Part IV.A.iv.

^"*

Administrative Proceeding Release, No. 3-9333, 64

^"'

Amended

V.

Ari

SEC Docket

1997)

Fames

et al,

Regulation

S,

SEC

Litigation Release No.

supra note 127,

16877

(Jan. 31.

2001)

SEC Docket 1958

at s 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2).

at

1961 (June 18. 1997)

B
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domestic reporting issuers) could

still

be regarded as purchasing the securities for the

purposes of distribution.

Probable Impact of Amendments on Marketplace Concerns

As

outlined earlier, the markets raised concerns about the operation of Regulation S^".

These concerns included discounting, a lack of disclosure and the dilutive effects of the
Regulation S shares flowing back into the U.S market. These concerns are discussed

below

A.

It

in light

of the amendments.

Greater Discounts Will

seems

likely that

Be Offered By Domestic Issuers

because the holding period

is

extended for equity securities of

reporting issuers to one year, such issuers will probably give even greater discounts than

in the past.

This

is

because of the greater risks that purchasers have to face, as well as

the decreased transferability that such securities

issuers will

attract

have

face given the increased

Furthermore, because domestic reporting and nonreporting

transactional restrictions.

issuers are subjected to the

now

same

to offer an

restrictions,

it

seems

likely that

domestic nonreporting

even greater discount to prospective purchasers in order to

them because nonreporting

issuer securities are less tradable in the

market than

the securities of reporting issuers.

^'°

This

is

the definition of an underwriter in 15

U.C.S

Administative Proceeding Release, No. 3-9333, 64
^" See discussion infra Part IV.
^'^

Amended

Regulation

230.144(a)(3)(v).

S,

5Mpranote 127,

s

77b(l

1).

SEC Docket

See In the Matter of GFL Ultra Fund,
at 1960 (June 18, 1997).

1958

at ss 230.903(b)(3)(iii)-(iv),

230.905. See also Rule 144 -

s
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B. Dilution

With

May Become a Problem Depending on

greater discounts likely to be offered

purchasers

may

the Discounts Offered

by offerors of domestic equity

securities,

choose to wait out the period, given that the substantial discount would

provide incentive to hold on to the securities for the entire length of the period. Then

upon completion of the one year

restricted period the offshore purchasers

would

probably create a huge wave of securities flowing back into the U.S market.
result

of this increase

in the

As a

supply of securities on the market the price of the shares in

question would probably reduce, thus creating an even greater dilution problem than in
the past. In short, the dilutive effects will depend entirely on the attractiveness of the

discount offered. Given the discussion below

much

able to discount as

as they

may want

7

1

J,

it

to,

would appear

that issuers

may

not be

without facing some repercussions from

domestic issuers.

C.

Disclosure

Under

the

May Become

a Problem

amendments, the SEC changed the reporting requirement from a

fifteen

day

period to quarterly reporting..^ '^ This change should result in sufficient disclosure for
current shareholders about an issuer's Regulation S offering before the dilutive effects

of the offering are

felt. It

will also provide shareholders with a

chance to query when

these discounts are perceived as being too large, therefore preventing sales of shares

under Regulation S

^'^
^'^
^'"''

at

whatever price the issuer sees

Proposed Amendments Release, supra note
See supra Chapter 7.III.C.
Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9637.

1

18, at

9265

fit.
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However, should
has taken place, and

it

if the

become apparent

to the

market that a Regulation S offering

market learns of this happening before the shareholders do,

then short selling of the issuer's stock

may

occur. This

issuer's share price occurring without the prior

would

result in a

drop

in the

knowledge of the shareholders who

could therefore not escape this reduction in share price.

CHAPTER EIGHT
Recommendations Should Abuses and Marketplace Concerns Regarding the
Regulation Continue After the

As

outlined above, there

may

Amendments

still

remain some opportunity for the abuse of Regulation

S to take place in spite of the amendments. Discussed below are some suggestions

which may help eliminate some of the abuses and concerns, should they continue
the

A.

amendment."

Clarify the

Law Regarding the Abuses and the Marketplace Concerns

The Needfor Clarity

i.

Previously, the

SEC

determined whether or not a certain transaction was a violation of

Regulation S by interpreting Preliminary Note 2

.

The SEC

detailed

as violations of Regulation S in the Problematic Practices Release.^'

cases

^'*

after

the transactions in question took place before the

See Jon B. Jordan, Regulation S and Offshore Capital: Will the

what

it

perceived

However

SEC had made

in

some

its

New Amendments Rid the Safe Harbor

of Pirates. 19 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 58 (1998)
^'^
Adopting Release, supra note 9, at Preliminary Note 2 where it is stated that "in the view of the
objective of these rules and the policies underlying the Act, Regulation S is not available with respect to
any transaction or series of transactions that, although in technical compliance with these rules, is part of a
plan or scheme to evade the registration provisions of the Act'".
'*
Problematic Practices Release, supra note 77, at 35,663 - 35,664
^'^
For example In the Matter of GFL Ultra Fund, Administrative Proceeding Release, No. 3-9333, 64 SEC
Docket 1958 (June 18, 1997).
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interpretations that hedging

In the

and some uses of promissory notes were not

amendments, however, the

SEC

failed to clarify

retroactive powers. This lack of clarity has

have been structured

meant

in a relatively cautious

that

its

permitted.'^^°

position with regard to

some Regulation S

manner. For example,

many

its

transactions

issuers'

category two securities have also complied with the category three requirements.

"Domestic issuers
certification

practice"

"'

under Regulation S already comply with the

that sell equity securities

and legending requirements of Category
in order to ensure that they

charged them with, and to make them

3 as a matter

of common

meet the requirements of whatever the

'safe"

SEC

from any retroactive application of the

regulation.

This uncertainty does not help the operation of the Regulation. The

be well advised to clarify the Regulation
violation and to

what

extent, if any,

it

in

terms of what exactly

See supra

^^'

Amending

text

accompanying note 100

Release, supra note 28, at 9639

considers to be a

has retroactive powers, in order to create a greater

degree of certainty in the operation of the Regulation.

^^"

it

SEC would

62

Ways of Clarifying

ii.

the Regulation

In order to clarify the regulation, the

SEC

could either state directly what

being abuses in the regulation or alternatively,
to the abuses

of Regulation S that

it

it

perceives as

could rewrite the regulation relating

it

occur.'^'^^

Incorporate Rule 144 Promissory Note Provisions Directly Into Regulation S

1.1.

The

current approach regarding Promissory Notes

with Regulation S.

is to

read Rule 144 in conjunction

Although these two rules overlap, they do not

address the promissory notes issue.

What

Rule 144 to be explicitly written

Regulation

in

is

needed
S.

is

in

any way directly

for the provisions contained in

This could then

make

the Rule 144

provisions apply to the issuer safe harbors and relate the distribution compliance period

to the holding period for the

position and

B.

Rule 144 provisions.

A measure

remove the necessity to read a separate

like this

would

clarify the

regulation.

Recommendations Concerning Promissory' Notes

if a

More

Clarified Regulation

does not Work

Should the

SEC

choose not

to clarify its position

such a clarified regulation did not work, then the

"^ Although an overstatement of what

is

with respect to promissory notes, or if

SEC

could consider the following.

considered an abuse could result

in

must always be taken to prevent this from occurring.
"^ Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.905 and see Rule 144 at

enabling the creation of

further loopholes, care

s

230.144(d)(2).
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/.

Toll the One Year Holding Period Until Promissory Notes are Fully Paid

At present, the

restricted period

does not begin

until the

promissory note states that

recourse will be provided against the purchaser of the securities. Such recourse

secured by collateral that has a fair market value, and that

is

full

is to

be

equal in value to the

purchase price of the Regulation S securities." Following the expiration of the
restricted period the

promissory note

can be resold under Regulation

S.""^

is

required to be fully paid for before the securities

Under

the

amendment

this

means

conceivably, a purchaser could borrow in order to pay the note off in

that.

its

entirety

and

then immediately resell the security, after which the loan could be repaid. This would

mean

that the purchaser

would be paying

for the

promissory note with the funds

acquired from the sale of the Regulation S securities - a transaction type which the

amendment had

tried to forclose. Therefore,

one way

to stop this practice

from

occurring (essentially similar to that which happened before the amendment) would be

to toll the distribution

compliance period

until the note

"' See Rule 144, 15 U.S.C s 230. 144(d)(2)(i)(ii) (1994)
^^^
Id., and Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9637

has been paid for entirely.
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Prohibit the Use of Promissory Notes Altogether as

a.

Payment for Regulation S

Securities

Should the problem with promissory notes continue, another more extreme measure

would be

to prohibit altogether the use

domestic equity securities. The

initial

amendments,

^

although

SEC
it

of promissory notes as a means of payment for

did in fact propose such an alternative with

did not mature into an actual

its

amendment because of

commentators" concerns.

C

Place

More

Clarifying

Language

in the Regulation Stating that the

Resale Safe

Harbor Cannot be Used to "Wash Off" Restrictions
Reading Rule 905 and Rule 144 together, the resale safe harbor appears not to be
available to

were

to

"wash off

restrictions.^^''

amend Regulation S

to clarify

It

may

its

be more appropriate, however,

position that the resale safe harbor

used as a

way of "washing

together.

Such a statement could be similar

off" restrictions as

opposed

to that

it

to

if the

is

SEC

not to be

having to read the two rules

issued in the Problematic Practices

Release.^^^

"' Proposed Amendments Release, supra note
8, at 9262 - 9263
"' Amended Regulation S, sidpra note 127, at s 230.905 which concerns resale limitations. It states that;
"Equity securities of domestic issuers acquired from the issuer, a distributor, or any of their respective
affiliates in a transaction subject to the conditions of s 230.901 or s 230.903 are deemed to be "restricted
securities" as defined in s 230.144. Resales of any such restricted securities by the offshore purchaser must
1

be made
^^*

in accordance with
See supra note 77

this

Regulation S."

1
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D. Hedging Activities Prohibited Under the Regulation

Need to be

Clarified in the

Regulation

Hedging continues

to cause confusion because

For example, in the

GFL

Ultra case

the

SEC

of the uncertain stance taken by the SEC.
stated that

hedging was prohibited by

Regulation S and anti- hedging measures were included in the amendments.
Furthermore, section 230.902(g)(l)(ii)

of the amendments

distributor agrees in writing

and sales of equity securities of domestic

issuers, not to

engage

added)", and likewise

in

it

...

for offers

states that ''Each

hedging transactions with regard to such securities (emphasis
is

stated in s 230.902(g)(2)

^'

that ''[F]or offers

and sales of

equity securities of domestic issuers, such offering materials and documents also must

state that

in

hedging transactions involving those securities may not be conducted unless

compliance with the Act (emphasis added)"".

also appears in

s

However the
place any

new

A

similar prohibition against hedging

230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2-3) of the amendments.

release

accompanying the amendments

restrictions

on

hedging,'^^^

which seems

to

stated that the

be

at

changes did not

odds with the actual text

of the amendment as outlined above. Therefore the SEC's position with regard to

hedging

"'
at

In the

is

ambiguous and needs

to

be

clarified.

Matter of GFL Ultra Fund, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-9333, 64

1961 (June 18, 1997)

"" Amended Regulation

S,

supra note 127

"' Id

"^ Amending Release, supra note 28,

at n.

28

SEC Docket

1958

66

Recommendations
Domestic Issuers

the

if

Amended

Regulation Becomes too Restrictive for

Absence of Abuses

in the

Given the tightening of the regulations pertaining
that Regulation

issuers.

have

The

S

may no

longer be used as a

make

stricter regulations will

to offer discounts,

requirements. The

SEC

and

domestic issuers

it

means of raising foreign

noted

conceivable

is

capital

by these

their offerings less attractive so that they

new

compliance costs will increase with the

their

itself

to

may

notice

that:

The amendments will impose restrictions on purchasers of equity securities of
U.S issuers, as well as on the issuers themselves, that may make it more costly
for such issuers to raise funds through Regulation S placements

Commission believes

that these restrictions are

needed

.

.

to prevent

.

however, the

abusive

practices that have occurred under Regulation S.

Given

that a significant

amount of disclosure

own

is

already required from domestic

reporting issuers,

by

issuers), then

debatable whether the two classes of issuers should be required to

fulfil

the

same

If the

a

it

is

virtue of their

restrictions

amended

nature (as opposed to domestic nonreporting

and regulations.

regulation

becomes too

number of different measures with

restrictive,

then the

distribution compliance period to six months,

on such

back into Category

"^ Id

at Part

securities.

Two

(as they

V. Cost Benefit Analysis

could consider

respect to domestic reporting issuers,

already subject to other disclosure mechanisms. For example,

classification

SEC

it

who

are

could reduce the

and remove the restricted securities

The SEC could

also consider putting such securities

were originally)

or. alternatively,

making

the

67
transactional requirements similar to

the

what they were

more onerous requirements of Category Three.

in

Category Two, as opposed to

CHAPTER NINE

The Challenges Posed by Globalization

As

^

alluded to at the beginning of this thesis,

poses

many

the globahzation of securities markets

challenges to regulators. These challenges include "the increasing

integration of the world's financial markets and the presence of systemic risk, referring

to a

simultaneous collapse of the securities markets worldwide".

"

The debate over

the

regulation of global securities markets grows in importance as the internationalization

of capital markets continues

dramatic pace. There are varied approaches that

at a

regulators have adopted in response to this rapidly evolving international marketplace,

several of which will be discussed below.

A. Extraterritorality of the United States Securities Regime

The United

States often applies

countries, justifying

its

its

approach stating

It is still

whole
234
235

I.

American investors and the

However, many commentators disagree with

this

that:

in the best interests

of the United States and of the global economy as a

for disclosure regulation to be undertaken at the national level

See supra Part

Marc

domestic securities laws to transactions in other

actions as necessary to protect

integrity of U.S. capital markets.

extraterritorial

own

and for the

II.B

Steinberg

&

Lee

Jurisdictional Approaches,

E. Michaels, Disclosure in

Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of
J. INT'L L. 207, 209 (1999)

Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH.

68

69
United States to apply

regime only to those issuers that have their economic

its

center of gravity in the United States."

/.

Section 5

and Regulation S

SEC

Regulation S was adopted by the

application"'^"'^

globalization.

of section 5"

of the section 5 registration provisions in the face of increasing

It

.

in order "to clarify the extraterritorial

establishes a limitation to the possible world-wide jurisdictional reach

Rules 901 through 904. which form the body of Regulation

S. take a

primarily territorial approach to jurisdiction. Regulation S gives "recognition to the
doctrine of comity and the territorial approach to the application of section 5""^

some commentators

.

While

believe Regulation S to be ineffective in dealing with

globalization^'^°, others believe that

by limiting the application of U.S. laws and

providing clear means for both investors and issuers to opt-out of the domestic
regulatory system,

it

increases regulatory competition^^' which, in turn, fiirthers the

general goals of securities

laws.'^'*'^

"' CHOI & GUZMAN, supra note
"^ Adopting Release, supra note 9,

6. at
at

1

903.

8306

"\See supra Pan U.C.
"' Adopting Release, supra note 9. at 8306
^*°
"Most of the efforts made through regulation S and the extraterritorial application of the Securities Act
to deal with the increasing internationalization of the securities markets have been misguided" CHOI &
GUZMAN.,vM/7ra note 6, at 914
Jane C. Kang, The Regulation of Global Futures Markets: Is Harmonization Possible or Even
Desirable^. 17 J. INT'L. L. BUS. 242 (1996)
^'^
See supra text accompanying notes 267-68
1
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//.

Justifications

of Extraterritoriality

"Congress intended the Exchange Act
protect domestic investors

who have

to

have

extraterritorial application in order to

purchased foreign securities on American

exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities"

market

may

.

as confidence in a nation's capital

decline if fraudulent companies are allowed to issue securities in the market

or traders are allowed to engage in manipulative practices.

However

the differing

approaches detailed below are also argued to further the goals of securities regulation of
investor and market protection.

Approaches

to the International

Generally, most

modem

Regulation of Securities

securities markets are regulated

on a national

basis. This

practice creates a challenge in light of the increased internationalization of the securities

markets and the increasing interdependence

among them.

application of national securities regimes as a

securities

Alternatives to extraterritorial

means of regulating

the international

market are detailed below.

There are two key viewpoints which have developed

in dealing

with the

challenges posed in regulating a global marketplace. Supporters of harmonization of
securities regulation argue that standardization of regulatory requirements

countries

would enhance protection

for investors

and

among

level the playing field in the

competition for market share. They argue that "regulatory disharmony remains a

"^ Schoenbaum

v.

Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,

206

(4"^ Cir.

1968) (Judge Lumbard)

71
significant obstacle to the effectuation of an integrated international market".

opposing view
issuers

is

in favor

and investors

in

'^'*^

The

of regulatory competition, which would provide choice to

how they

should be regulated. Advocates of regulator}'

competition assert that harmonization could lead to excessive regulation without
sufficient corresponding regulatory benefit. This belief

is

based on the

many

distinguishing characteristics of each nation's market maturity, history, culture and legal

system, which would

make

it

very difficult to find a single solution which

is

viable for

every country.

Various regulatory approaches have been taken

in

response to globalization,

each intended to meet either the goal of harmonization or regulatory competition in a
global marketplace.

A.

Cooperation^''^

In an increasingly global

jurisdictions,

it

may

economy with complex

offerings taking place in several

not be feasible for regulators in each country to attempt to enforce

the perceived regulatory goals of that jurisdiction. In order to harmonize different

regulatory approaches

bilateral

some

nations are beginning to cooperate internationally both on a

and multilateral basis

in order to carry out their regulatory

and enforcement

objectives.

The aim of cooperation
used by

"'

all

is

the development of a

participants in international offerings.

STEINBERG & MICHAELS,

supra note 235,

at

208

^

common

In order to

set

of regulations to be

encourage and

72

implement cooperation
organized what

is

in the international market, in

today

known

as

IOSCO

.

1

974 several western

lOSCO's pnmary

nations^"*^

objective today

is

to

develop, on a global basis, high standards of financial market regulation, minimize

systemic risk and

facilitate cross

border transactions^"*^.

Other commentators believe a better approach to the international regulation of
securities

would be one which encourages regulatory competition among

regimes and provides choice

two of which

to issuers

in

how

they should be regulated.

are discussed below.

Normal Reciprocity

B.

Under a normal

reciprocity securities regime'^"^°. a country allows a foreign issuer to sell

securities within

the issuer's

its

domestic jurisdiction while complying only with the regulations of

own jurisdiction. Normal

the regulatory choices to investors

it

and investors

different

reciprocity fosters capital mobility

who

are unable to sift capital abroad

by increasing

-

so in this

way

increases regulatory competition.

^'*'

^^^

Sometimes referred to as commonality.
The benefits of cooperation are argued to include "the use of uniform information

in

making global

investment decisions, the lowering of transaction costs, the facilitation of cross-border offerings, and the

Manning G. Warren, Global Harmonization of Securities
Laws: The Achievements of the European Communities. 31 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 185, 191 (1990)
^'^
The charter members of IOSCO are Quebec and Ontario.
^'*^
IOSCO was initially called the Inter American Association of Securities Commissions
"''
STEINBERG & mIcHAELS, supra note 235, at n.2 13
ability to establish an international database".

As

at

July 1996, there were 465 agreements in place

Understanding and Similar Agreements Between
^'"

in

52 jurisdictions,

IOSCO Members

IOSCO

Index of

Memorandum of

(July 1996)

Normal reciprocity can be found outside of the securities context. For example, many countries will
honor the drivers licenses of other countries. Either the actual drivers license is accepted or individuals can
obtain a visitor license by showing their foreign license without having to comply with local testing
requirements.
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Normal

reciprocity

is

advantageous for issuers because

selling securities abroad as parties are freed

new

from having

it

to learn

decreases the cost of

and comply with a

of laws when they enter a new jurisdiction. Rather, parties

set

follow their

own

may

continue to

domestic laws regardless of the jurisdiction in which the transactions

take place. Alternatively, if the issuer prefers the foreign jurisdiction's regime, the

issuer

may

choose to comply with

The United

securities regulation instead.

States has a reciprocity agreement with

Multijurisdictional Disclosure

this

its

Canada

called the

System (MJDS,) which was established

agreement Canadian issuers

may

issue securities in the U.S. while

in 1991.

Under

complying only

with Canadian registration and disclosure requirements so long as their financial
statements conform to U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. So Canadian

issuers

need not avoid American capital markets simply because they dislike the U.S.

securities regulatory regime.

Normal

reciprocity only allows an issuer to carry a domestic regime abroad as

the issuer seeks capital in other countries.

another country's laws. Consequently,
reciprocity does not

maximize the

CHOI & GUZMAN,

supra note

6, at

does not allow a domestic firm to "import"

some commentators""

'

believe that normal

potential for regulatory competition,

the portable reciprocity approach instead.

"'

It

921

and they support

74
C. Portable Reciprocity

Under

a portable reciprocity approach, participating countries

select the securities

Once

selected,

trading of the

one

regime under which
set

their securities transactions

of securities laws would govern

company's

would allow

securities, regardless

issuers to

would be governed.

aspects of the issuance and

all

of the physical location of the

^'

transactions.

Portable reciprocity rejects territorial notions of jurisdiction and allows

securities

market participants to choose the most appropriate regulatory regime for

themselves. In this way, portable reciprocity essentially allows issuers to determine the

jurisdictional reach

of different countries" securities regimes.

"Portable reciprocity extends the concept of reciprocity to include multiple
countries, diverse regulations, and greater issuer choice".

nationality, investor nationality,

"

Any combination of issuer

regime choice, and transaction location are permissible

under a portable reciprocity regime. Therefore the choice of capital markets and the
choice of governing law are completely separate.

Because issuers

will

choose the most efficient securities regime to govern their

transaction, countries will have an incentive to provide such regimes in order to

expand

or maintain their capital markets, therefore regulatory competition will increase. Also,

"to the extent that extra regulatory protections are costly to issuers

and not valued by

"^ For example, consider a U.S. based multinational firm named X. Co. Under a portable reciprocity
regime X. Co. could choose to apply the laws of any participating country to a securities offering in the
United States. The choice of regime is entirely up to X. Co. Furthermore, X. Co.'s transactions could take
place within any of the participating countries.
"^ CHOI & GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 921

.
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sophisticated investors, global market efficiency

and investors

to

is

increased by allowing such issuers

bypass these regulatory protections through their selection of an
^^"^

alternate securities regime".

This thesis follows other commentators'

"

m asserting that portable reciprocity

provides the best solution to the challenges of the international securities market. "^^

It is

argued that portable reciprocity best advances the goals of securities laws, as regulatory
competition

among

Investors

return

countries will benefit and protect both investors and capital markets.

would

benefit from a portable reciprocity approach as

on investment because

compliance
issuers

may

costs.

To

it

the extent that issuers are forced to bear high compliance costs,

action reduces the investor's return

investor protection.

consider

in

It

of their

on investment.
is

when choosing an investment -

may

the regime

choose to

which the issuer chose

restrict their

quality issuers will choose to

Dangerous

"'

CHOI & GUZMAN,

Extraterritoriality,

strict,

There are those

who

from lower

at

220.

1

criticize portable reciprocity as creating investor

realize that securities trading in a particular capital

Opposers of portable reciprocity also claim

Cont. Next Page

investors can

comply with the U.S. regime.

supra note 243,
6, at 950-5

supra note

to trade

investments to securities

that only high quality issuers seeking to distinguish themselves

^'^

by increasing

achieves this by introducing an additional factor for investors to

issued under U.S. laws. Because American securities laws are very

laws.

securities. Either

which portable reciprocity benefits investors

under. For example, investors

assume

increases the

allows issuers to choose the regime with the least

either exit the capital markets or raise the price

Another way

it

market are

in fact

confusion

if

investors

fail to

governed by another jurisdiction's

that the resulting regulatory competition

may

result in

76
Portable reciprocity provides capital market protection in at least

First,

it

two ways.

allows issuers and investors to avoid a country's overly burdensome regulatory

regime while

still

trading in the capital markets of that country. Secondly,

it

increases

investor confidence in the capital market to the extent that issuers select regimes

which

maximize the joint welfare of issuers and

volume

and

investors. This increases the securities

liquidity of a country's capital markets.

For the above-mentioned reasons
ideal

approach for countries

to

^

this thesis

endorses portable reciprocity as the

adopt to the international regulation of securities.

countries adopting laws aimed towards opportunistic managers rather than laws designed to
social value in the capital markets. See

^" For example, investors

may be

maximize

STEINBERG & MICHAELS,

adverse to trading

in

supra note 235, at 267.
a small country's market due to its weak regulatory

regime. However, under a portable reciprocity scheme an issuer can choose a stricter regime to govern the
issuer's transactions in

order to induce investors to trade

in the

small country's capital markets.

7

77

CHAPTER TEN

Conclusion

It is

important not to forget

why

Regulation S was introduced

1990. Essentially, the Regulation

made

it

it

was adopted

in

easier for domestic entities to raise capital

offshore by reducing the costs involved and also by

attractive to offshore investors.

when

The impetus

making domestic

for the introduction

entities

more

of Regulation S was

the increasing globalization taking place, the uncertainty created as a result of the

potentially

worldwide reach of section

Release No. 4708

still left

which resulted

"

some continuing

Regulation S in 1990,

in

5

"a voluminous series of no-action

uncertainties".

many

of the Securities Act 1933. and the ensuing

"

However,

unintentional loopholes

letters,

after the introduction

which

of

became apparent. These loopholes

included illegal resales within the restricted period, the creation and use of fake offshore
shell entities, the use

notes, the use

of the proceeds of the Regulation S resales to pay for promissory

of the resale safe harbor

to "lock in profits".

to

"wash off

restrictions,

and the use of hedging

These loopholes were exploited by many investors and

entities

alike.

^"''

See supra note

"'

RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET

(8th ed. 1998)

1

AL, SECURITIES

REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS

577
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It

was

against this backdrop of abuse that marketplace concerns developed

regarding the original Regulation.

The marketplace became concerned about the

discounting that was occurring on Regulation S securities because not only
discounting only available to foreign investors,

in large yet

it

was

often not disclosed. This resulted

unexplained flows of Regulation S securities entering the U.S market.

Initially the

SEC

acted to put a halt to both the 'abuses and the marketplace

concerns by issuing the Problematic Practices Release^^' in 1995.

however, that the

SEC

issued

its

proposed amendment, the

was no change

resale safe harbors.

SEC

in

adopted an amended Regulation S

The amendments
the

regulation

A

amendments have
was

initially

likely

not until 1997,

S^^".

also

changes were made to both the issuer and

saw

amendments

1998. While

in

the addition of a

in

new rule, Rule

905.

an effort to put a stop to the perceived

exploitation and abuse of the original Regulation S. Yet in doing so,

that these

was

which comments were sought regarding the

to the general statement,

The SEC introduced

It

proposed amendments to Regulation

Following a discussion period

there

was such

instead acted to curb

some of the very

it

would appear

objectives that the

intended to promote.

impact of the amendments

is that,

due

to the additional

compliance

measures, the cost of raising capital under Regulation S will increase. Further,

-

the abuses appear to be able to continue

albeit

many of

with more difficulty. While

marketplace concerns relating to disclosure seem to have been addressed, concerns over

"° See 5wpra Part IV.B.
*'
See supra note 77
"^ Proposed Amendments Release, supra note

1

18.
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discounting have not been adequately dealt with, instead

it

appears that even greater

discounting and dilution could potentially occur under the amendments.

Given

that the

amendments generally do not seem

concerns arising from the original Regulation S.

it

may be

consider various other measures in addressing Regulation

the

SEC

to deal with the

abuses and

appropriate for the

S.

SEC

to

Clarifying the powers that

possesses with respect to the regulation would help, especially as concerns

exist regarding the retroactive

powers of the Commission. '^"^ Further,

clarification

regarding promissory notes, the use of the resale safe harbor to "wash off" restrictions,

and the use of hedging would be

relatively simple

measures the

SEC

could apph' in

order to help the operation of the amendment.

Should

it

become evident following

concerns remain, then the

SEC

the

amendments

that the

marketplace

could consider improving the disclosure provisions

regarding Regulation S securities. This would presumably

make shareholders aware of a

Regulation S offering and provide them with an opportunity to

sell

before the flow back

of shares into the U.S. market.

Another possibility following the amendments

is

that the regulation

may become

too restrictive for domestic issuers. If this were found to be the case, then perhaps the

SEC

should reduce some of the restrictions on
Therefore, while Regulation S

respect to offshore offerings,

by the SEC. While

the

its

category of issuer.

was introduced

to provide greater certainty with

actual application has developed in a

SEC acknowledged

^" Amending Release, supra note 28.

this

this in its

amendments,

it

manner nintended

is still

not entirely

80
evident whether the amendments have in fact been successful in achieving their aims.

Perhaps instead what

same time

still

is

required

greater clarity of the

SEC"s

creating a fair and workable securities regime.

of capital markets will need

As

is

to

position, while at the

The

recent globalization

be taken into consideration in order to achieve

this.

the internationalization of securities markets continues, the importance of

effective regulation for offshore transactions grows. There are several possible

approaches to the regulation of international securities transactions: cooperation, normal
reciprocity and portable reciprocity.

However, because

it

best furthers the securities

regulation goals of investor and market protection, portable reciprocity

is

recommended

as the ideal approach for the United States (and other countries) to apply to the

regulation of international capital markets.

"* See supra Part

VIII.A./.

/. /.
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